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THE HURRICANE KATRINA LITIGATION AGAINST THE CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS: IS DENIAL OF GEOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
THE WAY TO SAVE NEW ORLEANS? 
Edward P. Richards, III
*
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The movie Rashomon presents the story of an event from the 
perspective of four storytellers. Depending on the point of view, the event 
could be a murder and rape or a battle of honor over a woman.1 Legal 
scholars have made much of the Rashomon Effect as an example of the 
ambiguity of truth and the effect of a person’s involvement in an event on 
the person’s view of the event.2 The story of Hurricane Katrina echoes 
Rashomon but includes many more unreliable narrators. The media story is 
of failed emergency response by a feckless Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) director and an uninvolved president. Social justice 
advocates tell of race discrimination and the right to return. New Orleans 
politicians and land developers tell of a city-owned endless federal support 
and protection because it has been sacrificed for navigation on the 
Mississippi River. Environmentalists tell of a paradise destroyed by the oil 
and gas industry,3 a paradise which can be restored if someone will just give 
Louisiana enough money.4 This article analyzes the story told by plaintiffs’ 
 
* This article is an expansion of the essay, Edward P. Richards, The Hurricane Katrina Levee 
Breach Litigation: Getting the First Geoengineering Liability Case Right, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 267 (2012); For additional information on climate change, the Mississippi 
Delta, and the Katrina litigation, see LSU LAW CENTER: CLIMATE CHANGE LAW & POLICY 
PROJECT, https://sites.law.lsu.edu/coast/. 
 1. Rashomon (Daiei Motion Picture Co. Ltd. 1950). 
 2. David Simon Sokolow, From Kurosawa to (Duncan) Kennedy: The Lessons of 
Rashomon for Current Legal Education, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 969, 981 (1991); see also Orit 
Kamir, Judgment by Film: Socio-Legal Functions of Rashomon, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 39 
(2000); Anthony Fassano, The Rashomon Effect, Jury Instructions, and Peremptory 
Challenges: Rethinking Hernandez v. New York, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 783 (2009). 
 3. Oliver A. Houck, The Reckoning: Oil and Gas Development in the Louisiana 
Coastal Zone, 28 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 185 (2015). This cri de cœur is a brilliant history of 
Louisiana as a third world petro state, dominated by oil companies and corrupt politicians, 
resulting in stunted public institutions and a weak educational system. 
 4. See generally COASTAL PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH. OF LA., LOUISIANA’S 
COMPREHENSIVE MASTER PLAN FOR A SUSTAINABLE COAST (2012), http://coastal.la.gov/2012-
coastal-master-plan/; David Batker et al., The Importance of Mississippi Delta Restoration on 
the Local and National Economies, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESTORATION OF THE MISSISSIPPI 
DELTA 141 (2014), http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789401787321. 
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lawyers and federal judges in three litigation threads against the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). In this story, New Orleans was 
flooded by the Corps through its knowingly negligent levee construction.5 
Each Katrina story has a grain of truth. All stories are variations on the 
myth that New Orleans can be restored to a cultural and environmental 
golden age. In each story, the golden age was stolen by a boogeyman who 
owes reparations because New Orleans cannot be expected to pay its own 
way.6 The boogeyman can be the oil industry,7 the Corps, FEMA, or an 
uncaring Congress. Each story is fatally incomplete. For example, it is true 
that if the levees had held and been tall enough, Hurricane Katrina would 
have caused much less damage. But long-term studies of levees show that 
they are never strong enough and tall enough to eliminate all risk.8 Levees 
are always a compromise between money, land to build them on, and 
aesthetics.9 They trade high frequency, low severity events for low 
frequency, high severity events.10 The result is a public surprised by 
catastrophic losses because people become convinced that the levees 
 
 5. See St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707 (2016), where a fourth 
litigation thread awarded damages based on a temporary taking by flooding as recognized in 
Arkansas Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012). St. Bernard (Fed. Cl.) 
accepted the record in the Robinson case, thus incorporating the same junk science on the 
effects of the MRGO. The Federal Circuit reversed this takings finding in St. Bernard Par. 
Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018), finding that, had there been a taking, 
the damages would have had to have been set off against the value of the flood control 
system. Since most of the plaintiffs would be underwater without the flood control system, 
and the rest also benefited from the flood control system, there were no damages and thus no 
taking. 
 6. One might argue that Blanche DuBois stands in for New Orleans: “I have always 
depended on the kindness of strangers.” Blanche DuBois, TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A 
STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE sc. 11, 165 (New Directions ed., 1947); “I don’t want realism. I 
want magic!” Blanche DuBois, TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DESIRE sc. 9, 
135 (New Directions ed., 1947). 
 7. There are two threads of litigation against the oil and gas industry for destroying 
wetlands, with the prayer for relief asking for huge restoration projects: Bd. of Comm’rs of 
Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth. E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., LLC, No. CA 13-5410, 2015 WL 
631348 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 2015) and Parish of Plaquemines v. Total Petrochemical & Ref. 
USA, Inc., 64 F. Supp. 3d 872 (E.D. La. 2014) (one of many identical suits against different 
defendant oil exploration companies). 
 8. AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, SO, YOU LIVE BEHIND A LEVEE!: WHAT YOU SHOULD 
KNOW TO PROTECT YOUR HOME AND LOVED ONES FROM FLOODS 18 (2009) (The post-Katrina 
levees around New Orleans are designed to protect against a 100-year storm. That means 
there is a 26% change that they will fail during a 30-year mortgage.). 
 9. Even if the federal government was willing to put up the money, would New Orleans 
have tolerated having the city cut into sections by levees hundreds of feet wide and 40 feet 
tall, making the city look like a series of isolated prison camps? 
 10. See Flood Control Act of 1928, 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018). The reports that lead to the 
Flood Control Act of 1928 stressed this tradeoff of risks, which was recognized in the Act by 
Section 702, the immunity provision that is at the heart of all the cases against the Corps. 
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eliminate all risk and thus attract more development. This is called the 
“levee effect.”11 If there truly are boogeymen, it is the local officials who 
allow risky development and do not properly prepare for disasters.12 
Congress is also complicit by providing the funds to build the levees and to 
subsidize flood insurance that allows flooded properties to be rebuilt in the 
same place. 
The false premise that underlies all the stories is the assumption that 
New Orleans is on a steady state earth, unaffected by geology and climate 
change. Both climate change and geology have a common path to disaster 
for New Orleans: increasing relative sea level, i.e., the combination of sea 
level rising from global warming and the loss of elevation from the 
subsiding delta.13 Small changes in sea level are critical because the 
Mississippi delta is very flat.14 Areas inside levees sink even faster50% of 
New Orleans is already below sea level. Elevation, or the lack of it, is fatal 
because Louisiana is hit by a hurricane on average every 2.8 years.15 Global 
warming will make these storms stronger.16 These risks make New Orleans 
an interesting story in itself, but it is also an exemplar of other high-risk 
delta cities.17 Many Asian population centers are on deltas, and they face the 
same deadly mix of sea level rise, subsidence, and deadly tropical 
cyclones.18 How the United States manages the long-term threat to New 
 
 11. Byron Newberry, Katrina: Macro-ethical issues for engineers, 16 SCI. & 
ENGINEERING ETHICS 535, 557–58 (2010) (This is a special case of the general “safe 
development paradox.”); see also Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the paradoxes 
of government disaster policy: Bringing about wise governmental decisions for hazardous 
areas, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2006). 
 12. Burby, supra note 11, at 171 (“The local government paradox is that while their 
citizens bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss in disasters, local officials pay 
insufficient attention to policies to limit vulnerability.”). 
 13. Large hurricanes just ride on top of relative sea level rise (RSLR) because they put 
everything underwater. But the effect in smaller storms is dramatic: “In wetland or wetland-
fronted areas of moderate peak surges (2–3m), the surge levels were increased by as much as 
1–3m (above the RSLR) for the RSLR simulation. The water level increases are as much as 
double and triple the RSLR over broad areas and as much as five times the RSLR in isolated 
areas.” Jane McKee Smith et al., Potential impact of sea level rise on coastal surges in 
southeast Louisiana, 37 OCEAN ENGINEERING 37, 46 (2010). 
 14. James P.M. Syvitski, Deltas at risk, 3 SUSTAINABILITY SCI. 23 (2008). 
 15. DAVID ROTH, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., LOUISIANA HURRICANE HISTORY 7 (2010), 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/noaa/lahurricanehistory.pdf. 
 16. Jeffrey P. Donnelly et al., Climate forcing of unprecedented intense-hurricane 
activity in the last 2000 years, 3 EARTH’S FUTURE 49, 50 (2015). 
 17. DELTARES, SINKING CITIES: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TOWARDS SOLUTIONS (Oct. 
2013), https://www.deltares.nl/app/uploads/2015/09/Sinking-cities.pdf. 
 18. See generally Laura E. Erban et al., Groundwater extraction, land subsidence, and 
sea-level rise in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 084010 (2014); Steve 
Brown & Robert J. Nicholls, Subsidence and human influences in mega deltas: The case of 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, 527 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 362, 374 (2015). 
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Orleans and the Mississippi delta will provide an example for other high-
risk delta cities. 
This article takes a deep look into the law in the levee breach cases 
because levees are a major risk in many places across the United States. A 
congressionally created study panel found that there are perhaps 100,000 
miles of levees in the United States, and most have not been properly 
maintained.19 As climate change exacerbates flooding events, levee breach 
litigation is likely to increase.20 The plaintiffs in the Katrina cases built a 
story around a steady state New Orleans that blamed the Corps for all of the 
changes over the past fifty years that have made the city ever more 
vulnerable to flooding. 21 They had the same sympathetic federal district 
court judge for three of the sets of cases.22 He made his position clear early 
in the proceedings: 
The cruel irony here is that the Corps cast a blind eye, either as a result 
of executive directives or bureaucratic parsimony, to flooding caused by 
drainage needs and until otherwise directed by Congress, solely focused 
on flooding caused by storm surge. Nonetheless, damage caused by 
either type of flooding is ultimately borne by the same public fisc. Such 
egregious myopia is a caricature of bureaucratic inefficiency.
23
 
 
 19. NAT’L COMM. ON LEVEE SAFETY, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A NATIONAL LEVEE 
SAFETY PROGRAM, A REPORT TO CONGRESS FROM THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEVEE 
SAFETY 13 (2009), http://cdm16021.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/p16021coll2/id 
/444. 
 20. Thomas Wahl et al., Increasing risk of compound flooding from storm surge and 
rainfall for major US cities, (Advance online publication) NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), 
http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2736.html; Iman 
Mallakpour & Gabriele Villarini, The changing nature of flooding across the central United 
States, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 250 (2015). 
 21. While not considered in this paper, there were numerous claims by individuals and 
businesses without separate flood insurance policies asking the court to find that their general 
property insurance covered their flood losses. The Louisiana Supreme Court rejected these 
claims, finding that it was not against public policy to exclude flood damage by explicit 
policy language, and that the standard form policy was not ambiguous as to the definition of a 
flood. See Sher v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 988 So. 2d 186 (2008); Landry v. La. Citizens Property 
Ins., 983 So. 2d 66 (2008). 
 22. Local federal judges are loath to rule against their neighbors in mass tort cases 
against the federal government. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); Allen v. 
United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied by Allen v. United States, 484 
U.S. 1004 (1988). 
 23. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 643 (E.D. La. 
2008) (17th Street Canal) judgment entered sub nom, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. 
Litig., No. 05-4181, 2010 WL 4068739 (E.D. La. Oct. 14, 2010) aff’d sub nom, In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Litig., 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit I), opinion 
withdrawn on reh’g, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(Robinson 5th Circuit II). For clarity, the parenthetical references will be used at the end of 
the footnote in which each case appears. 
2018] DENIAL OF GEOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 699 
This attitude drove the court’s attempt to convert the administrative 
Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) process into a typical mass tort case. 
A. Topography of New Orleans 
The topography of New Orleans makes it uniquely dangerous during 
hurricanes. Hurricane Katrina hit the Mississippi Coast with higher winds 
and surge than New Orleans, but within a few hours of the storm passing 
through, most of the water had drained back into the ocean and recovery 
could begin. In contrast, people in New Orleans were trapped in their houses 
and in shelters for days, with many dying of exposure before they could be 
rescued. This is because nearly 50% of New Orleans is below sea level, up 
to ten feet below sea level. St. Bernard Parish, east of New Orleans and 
between New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina, has significant land as much 
as six feet below sea level. 
Even the areas that are not below sea level are only slightly above. The 
coastal Mississippi delta is very flat and low. The only high ground is on the 
natural levees of the current and abandoned Mississippi River channels. 
These ridges are as high as twenty feet in New Orleans, but the highest 
natural elevation in St. Bernard parish to the east of New Orleans is twelve 
feet.24 Even at normal sea level, a large part of the New Orleans area is not 
hydrologically stable. It requires levees and constant pumping to prevent the 
bowl formed by areas below sea level from filling with water. The city is cut 
through with drainage canals that are used to channel this water north to 
Lake Pontchartrain. 
At the time of Hurricane Katrina, these drainage canals were open 
canals with gravity flow to Lake Pontchartrain. The pumps are in the lowest 
spots in the city to collect the rain water, well below sea level, and the lake 
end of the canal is above sea level to prevent the lake from flowing back 
into the city. This requires that the canal be elevated above sea level as it 
cuts through the parts of the city that are below sea level. The canal flows 
through high levees and concrete flood walls. Even on dry days, the level of 
water in the canal is at roof level in many places. This is also true of the 
Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) between the river and the lake25 (See 
 
 24. Paul V. Heinrich, Review of the Engineering Geology of St. Bernard Parish, 
Louisiana, 15 LA. GEOLOGICAL SURV. 6 (2005), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/la/geology/ 
18650587-Engineering-Geology-of-St-Bernard-Parish-Louisiana.pdf. 
 25. This canal was constructed by the City of New Orleans and the state between 1918 
and 1923 to provide a connection between the river, Lake Pontchartrain, and Intracoastal 
Canal which provides shipping east to Florida. The canal connects through the Mississippi 
through the Inner Harbor Navigation Canal Lock, which was built in 1921. LYNN M. 
ALPERIN, ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS WATER RES. SUPPORT CTR., HISTORY OF THE GULF 
INTRACOASTAL WATERWAY, NATIONAL WATERWAYS STUDY NWS-83-9, at 32 (1983), 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/mississippi/NWS_83-9.pdf. 
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Figure 1). A breach in the levees or flood walls, or a torrential rain storm 
that gets ahead of the pumps will rapidly flood tens of thousands of homes 
during times of normal sea level. 
 
 
Figure 126 
 
The IHNC forks before it reaches Lake Pontchartrain. The left fork 
continues to the lake, and the right goes east to connect with the Intracoastal 
Waterway, which then continues east to Florida and up the East Coast. The 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO), at the heart of all the litigation in 
this article, goes from the right fork of the IHNC and to the Gulf of Mexico. 
As early as 1921, New Orleans started lobbying Congress to build this 
shortcut to connect the Inner Harbor—being built along the fork of IHNC 
going to Lake Pontchartrain—to the Gulf of Mexico. This would allow ships 
to move from the Mississippi River through the IHNC Lock to the MRGO 
and to the Gulf of Mexico, cutting nearly 100 miles off the route through the 
river’s mouth south of New Orleans. Joined by eleven governors of states 
using Mississippi River shipping, New Orleans succeeded in 1956, and 
Congress authorized the construction of the MRGO.27 
 
 26. Provided by Richard Campanella, with permission. 
 27. ALBERT E. COWDREY, LAND’S END 72 (1977), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/climate/ 
mississippi/Lands-End.pdf. 
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The MRGO skirts the edge of Lake Borgne (an arm of the Gulf of 
Mexico) and then cuts southeast through wetlands in St. Bernard Parish to 
the Gulf of Mexico. Some of this area was slightly above sea level and 
supported cypress trees at the time the MRGO was built. Much of the area 
the canal was cut through was marsh at sea level. The original IHNC Lock, 
which connects the MRGO to the Mississippi River, was too small for ocean 
shipping vessels. Congress authorized the expansion of the lock along with 
the construction of the MRGO but this expansion was never built, so the 
MRGO was never a useful connection between the river and the Gulf.28 
Shortly after the MRGO was completed, St. Bernard Parish and east 
New Orleans, including the Ninth Ward, were flooded by Hurricane Betsy.29 
Plaintiffs who had been flooded claimed that the MRGO funneled water into 
the city and caused their properties to be flooded.30 The historic record 
belies this claim. Long before there were any Corps projects in this area, 
when the old growth cypress was intact as a buffer, St. Bernard Parish and 
the east side of New Orleans were catastrophically flooded by hurricanes 
several times.31 During the forty years between Hurricane Betsy and 
Hurricane Katrina, the risk of flooding increased substantially because St. 
Bernard Parish is on an abandoned lobe of the Mississippi River delta and is 
subsiding into the Gulf of Mexico as sea level rises.32 
 
 28. Inner Harbor Navigation Canal (IHNC) Lock Replacement, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENG’RS, https://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/About/Projects/IHNC-Lock-Replacement/ (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2019). For a discussion of the limited economic utility of the MRGO, see 
William R. Freudenburg et al., Disproportionality and Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the 
Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet, 90 SOC. SCI. Q. 497 (2009). 
 29. Andy Horowitz, Hurricane Betsy and the Politics of Disaster in New Orleans’s 
Lower Ninth Ward, 1965-1967, 80 J. S. HIST. 893, 894 (2014). 
 30. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 22 (5th Cir. 1971); claims dismissed for failure 
to show any negligence by the government and no evidence of increased flooding caused by 
the MRGO: Graci v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 189, 193, 196 (E.D. La. 1977). 
 31. The worst storm of the early years was “The Great Louisiana Hurricane” of August 
9, 1812. It rolled over the barrier islands and drowned Plaquemines and St. Bernard Parishes 
and the area around Barataria Bay under 15 feet of water. The parade ground at Fort St. 
Phillip was inundated by 8 feet of water and the shoreline along Lake Pontchartrain was 
similarly inundated, though this was far enough below the French Quarter to spare any 
flooding of the City. J. David Rogers, CHAPTER FOUR: HISTORY OF THE NEW ORLEANS FLOOD 
PROTECTION SYSTEM 4–14 (2006), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237543570_ 
CHAPTER_FOUR_HISTORY_OF_THE_NEW_ORLEANS_FLOOD_PROTECTION_ 
SYSTEM. 
 32. Heinrich, supra note 24, at 10. (“Ongoing regional and semi-regional subsidence 
also has implications for St. Bernard Parish. Subsidence not only accentuates the magnitude 
of flooding created by hurricane storm surge by physically lowering the land’s surface with 
time, it also reduces the effectiveness of existing levees and other flood control structures by 
reducing their height. In addition, subsidence further exacerbates the damage caused by storm 
surges by significantly contributing to land loss that reduces the moderating affect that 
marshes have on them.”). 
702 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
After Katrina, two class action cases resurrected the idea that the 
MRGO exacerbates the flooding on the east side by acting as a funnel for 
storm surge.33 In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation,34 discussed in this 
article, is a Federal Tort Claims Act case claiming negligence in the 
maintenance of the MRGO. St. Bernard Parish Government v. United 
States,35 is a takings case based on the MRGO increasing the flooding on the 
east side of New Orleans. Claims that the MRGO dramatically increases 
flooding defies common sense: MRGO was 2000 feet wide in places and 36 
feet deep in 2005. The surge front of the storm was fifty miles wide and 
more than fifteen feet high as it approached St. Bernard Parish. This 
dwarfed any effect of the MRGO: 
The calculated total volume entering the Funnel through the MRGO 
Reach 2 channel was 32 million cum. The total volume that entered 
through the GIWW channel was 6 million cum. The total volume 
entering through the Lake Borgne and the inundated wetlands segment 
was 632 million cum. The vast majority of water that moved into the 
Funnel, 94%, passed through Lake Borgne and over the inundated 
wetlands, not through the channels. Only 5% of the water volume 
entered through the MRGO channel, and only 1% entered through the 
GIWW channel. 
The storm surge snap-shots show that the Funnel had little influence on 
amplification of the storm surge during Katrina. In response to the 
predominant momentum balance between wind stress and water surface 
slope, maximum surge was generated along the MRGO Reach 2 levee, 
perpendicular to the primary and persistent northeasterly winds. Peak 
surge did not occur at the apex of the Funnel.
36
 
These findings were echoed in several other studies that were done by 
independent experts, not affiliated with the plaintiffs in these cases.37 There 
 
 33. Gary P. Shaffer et al., The MRGO Navigation Project: a massive human-induced 
environmental, economic, and storm disaster, 54 J. COASTAL RES. 206, 216 (2009) (note that 
some of the authors also participated in the plaintiffs’ litigation). 
 34. 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit II). 
 35. 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
 36. B.A. Ebersole et al., Development of storm surge which led to flooding in St. 
Bernard Polder during Hurricane Katrina, 37 OCEAN ENGINEERING 91, 99 (2010). 
 37. URS CORP., THE DIRECT IMPACT OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER GULF OUTLET ON 
HURRICANE STORM SURGE, at ES-2 (“The MRGO channel does not contribute significantly to 
peak surge during severe storms, when the conveyance of surge is dominated by flow across 
the entire surface of the coastal lakes and marsh. Nor does the channel contribute 
significantly to wave run-up”); see also JOANNES WESTERINK ET AL., NOTE ON THE INFLUENCE 
OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER GULF OUTLET ON HURRICANE INDUCED STORM SURGE IN NEW 
ORLEANS AND VICINITY 5 (2006), http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/cases/katrina/Army 
/Army%20Corps%20of%20Engineers/Influence%20of%20the%20MRGO%20on%20Storm
%20Surge.pdf; Pat J. Fitzpatrick et al., Myths about the cause of Hurricane Katrina’s storm 
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is a funnel, but it is formed by the intersection of St. Bernard Parish and the 
land bridge that closes off Lake Pontchartrain, which is really a bay on the 
Gulf of Mexico that a previous lobe of the delta closed off to form what is 
now a lake. Surge from the east does pile up in this funnel, just as it did long 
before the MRGO was built.38 Without levees in this area, the surge sweeps 
across the land bridge into Lake Pontchartrain and across St. Bernard Parish 
into east New Orleans. When the levees were added between the canals and 
the city, they provided a barrier that a slow-moving storm such as Hurricane 
Katrina could pile up surge against until the levees were overtopped and 
failed. This failure was not because they had been weakened by a poorly 
maintained MRGO, but because Hurricane Katrina had a storm surge and 
because they were as much as a meter lower than their design height 
because of unrecognized subsidence.39 
B. Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricane Katrina formed off the Bahamas and skirted south Florida 
and the Keys as a minor hurricane. It strengthened as it entered Gulf of 
Mexico, becoming a category 5 storm on August 28th about 250 miles south 
of the Mississippi-Alabama border.40 Its central pressure fell to 902 mb, 
which was the fourth lowest on record for the Atlantic Basin and the lowest 
measured inside the Gulf of Mexico. Hurricane Katrina moved across the 
tail of the Mississippi delta through lower Plaquemines Parish south of 
Buras as a category 4 storm with 140 mph winds at 6:10 AM on the 29th of 
August. It moved due north, to the east of New Orleans, and then made a 
second landfall near the mouth of the Pearl River at the Louisiana-
Mississippi border at 10:00 AM. At landfall, it was a category 3 storm with 
maximum sustained winds near 125 mph.41 The strongest winds and highest 
surges are in the northeast quadrant of a hurricane, which passed far to the 
 
surge, 29th Conference on Hurricanes and Tropical Meteorology, May 10–14 (2010), 
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/Fitzpatrick2007.pdf. 
 38. Joannes J. Westerink et al., A basin-to channel-scale unstructured grid hurricane 
storm surge model applied to southern Louisiana, 136 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 833, 859–
860 (2008). 
 39. Timothy H. Dixon et al., Space geodesy: Subsidence and flooding in New Orleans, 
441 NATURE 587 (2006) (“Here we present a new subsidence map for the city, generated 
from space-based synthetic-aperture radar measurements, which reveals that parts of New 
Orleans underwent rapid subsidence in the three years before Hurricane Katrina struck in 
August 2005. One such area is next to the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet (MRGO) canal, 
where levees failed during the peak storm surge: the map indicates that this weakness could 
be explained by subsidence of a metre or more since their construction.”). 
 40. RICHARD D. KNABB ET AL., NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., TROPICAL CYCLONE REPORT: 
HURRICANE KATRINA 23–30 AUGUST 2005, at 37 (Dec. 20, 2005), http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/ 
katrina/govdocs/TCR-AL122005_Katrina.pdf. 
 41. ROTH, supra note 15, at 54. 
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east of New Orleans. The areas outside of the levees on the east and north of 
the city were flooded by up to nineteen feet of water, but there was only 
limited wind damage in the city and what at first appeared to be little water 
inside the levees. The city breathed a sigh of relief until it was recognized 
that water was pouring over and through the levees and flood walls into the 
city.42 What happened next was driven by the topography of New Orleans. 
Hurricane Katrina effectively raised sea level on the east side of New 
Orleans by fifteen to nineteen feet and on the north side by ten to fourteen 
feet.43 On the east side of the city, the surge washed over the levees and then 
breached them, flooding the low-lying land and pouring downhill into the 
areas below sea level. On the north side of the city, a flood wall on the 17
th
 
Street Canal failed, allowing surge from Lake Pontchartrain to flood the city 
from the north. Additional drainage canal flood walls were overtopped or 
failed and flooded other parts of the city. A floodwall on the International 
Harbor Navigation Canal, which is on the west side of the Ninth Ward and 
to the east of the French Quarter, failed, allowing flood waters into the Ninth 
Ward.44 
When the flood walls in the Ninth Ward and the Lakeview area failed, 
water rushed into the city. The surge was already waning, but since the areas 
inside the flood walls were as much as 10 feet below sea level, it was like a 
dam breaking with 20 feet or more of water behind it. The water flowed 
down hill into the city as a raging torrent. This was a major factor in the 
death rates, because the risk of death from flooding increases dramatically 
with the velocity of the water.45 Near the breaches, houses were shattered 
 
 42. See Sheri Fink, The Deadly Choices at Memorial, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/magazine/30doctors.html (describing the receding 
flood waters on the night of Aug. 29, 2005—the day Katrina made landfall—and explaining 
that a local hospital had “seemed to have weathered one more storm”); see also Bob 
Marshall, City’s Fate Sealed in Hours, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 14, 2006, at A1 (“With 
Katrina already north of the city . . . the surge has begun to drop. For levees and floodwalls 
still standing, the overtopping is over. But the large sections of levees and floodwalls that 
have collapsed will keep bleeding water into the city for more than four days.”). 
 43. KNABB, supra note 40, at 37. 
 44. The iconic picture of a barge washed into the Ninth Ward was taken at the location 
of the break on the IHNC. See Analysis of the Transit of the Barge ING 4727 During 
Hurricane Katrina and Reasons Why it Did Not Cause the Failure of the Inner Harbor 
Navigation Canal Floodwall at 171, Figure 116, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. 
Litigation, No. 05-4182, 2011 WL 1792542 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011). In litigation involving 
the barge, the district court determined that the barge washed ashore after the break and that 
the barge company was not liable for causing the break. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. 
Litig., No. 05-4182, 2011 WL 1792542, at *1710 (E.D. La. Jan. 20, 2011). 
 45. S. N. Jonkman & J. K. Vrijling, Loss of life due to floods, 1 J. FLOOD RISK MGMT. 
43, 50 (2008). 
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and some were swept off their foundations.46 People had little time to get to 
safety in attics. Later analysis showed that “mortality rates were highest in 
areas near breaches and in areas with large water depths. The highest 
mortality fractions were observed near the severe breaches in Lower 9th 
Ward flood wall.”47 
The water level’s final equilibrium after the breach was only a few feet 
above ordinary sea level, but this was as much as fifteen feet above ground 
level in the lowest areas of the city.48 It took several days to plug the holes in 
the flood walls and start the pumps to clear the water from the city. This 
delay made it difficult to rescue the injured and infirm and greatly increased 
the death toll.49 
The areas on the ridges did not flood, including most of the French 
Quarter. Lower areas that were still above sea level were flooded, but 
drained quickly. While there was some wind damage in the New Orleans 
metropolitan area, most of the property damage and deaths were due to 
flooding in the bowl areas below sea level. 
The geologic and hydrologic factors that made Hurricane Katrina so 
deadly for New Orleans will increase over time.50 The risk of catastrophic 
flooding from any given hurricane increases with relative sea level rise 
(subsidence plus sea level rise from climate change). For any given size 
storm in the future, the relative sea level rise since Hurricane Katrina will be 
added to the inherent surge of the storm.51 As relative sea level increases, the 
depth of the bowl formed by the floodwalls and levees increases. The water 
behind the dam formed by the flood walls and levees is higher, so more 
water will pour into the city, at a higher velocity, than with Hurricane 
 
 46. Aimilia K. Pistrika & Sebastiaan N. Jonkman, Damage to residential buildings due 
to flooding of New Orleans after hurricane Katrina, 54 NAT. HAZARDS 413, 422–423 (2010). 
 47. Sebastiaan N. Jonkman et al., Loss of Life Caused by the Flooding of New Orleans 
After Hurricane Katrina: Analysis of the Relationship Between Flood Characteristics and 
Mortality, 29 RISK ANALYSIS 676, 695 (2009). 
 48. Pumps begin to drain New Orleans, CNN (Sept. 6, 2005, 2:17 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/05/neworleans.levees/. 
 49. Joan Brunkard et al., Hurricane Katrina Deaths, Louisiana, 2005, 2 DISASTER MED. 
& PUB. HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 215–23 (2008) (“The mean age of Katrina victims was 69.0 
years (95% confidence interval [CI], 67.8–70.2), and their age range was 0 to 102 years. 
Approximately 50% of the people who died as a result of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana 
were 75 years old and older.”). 
 50. A. Miller et al., Risk to life due to flooding in post-Katrina New Orleans, 15 NAT. 
HAZARDS & EARTH SYS. SCI. 59 (2015). 
 51. Ning Lin & Eric Shullman, Dealing with Hurricane Surge Flooding in a Changing 
Environment: Part I. Risk Assessment Considering Storm Climatology Change, Sea Level 
Rise, and Coastal Development, 31 STOCHASTIC ENVTL. RES. & RISK ASSESSMENT 2379, 
2379–2400 (2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00477-016-1377-5 (as sea level 
rises, either because of direct sea level rise or because the land is sinking, the surge from the 
storm is added to the higher sea level). 
706 UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Katrina.52 Concerns with social justice and preserving the demographics of 
New Orleans lead to adopting a “right of return” policy.53 As a result, there 
were no limits on rebuilding in the lowest areas of the city.54 An analysis of 
the risk of severe flooding and loss of life in New Orleans with the new 
levees and flood control structures in place found that New Orleans is still at 
risk of catastrophic flooding.55 
Despite the increasing risk of catastrophic flooding through time, 
people’s fear of flooding decreases as time passes since the last flooding 
event. This leads to more and higher value construction and more population 
in the high-risk zone. These are key issues in developing a long-term policy 
to manage the risk in New Orleans, but they are notably absent in the steady 
state world legal narrative embodied in the claims against the Corps. 
II. HURRICANE KATRINA–THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT CASES 
When Hurricane Betsy flooded New Orleans in 1965, there were fewer 
than eighty-two deaths.56 Hurricane Katrina was not a dramatically stronger 
storm when it hit New Orleans, but it killed between 986 and 1440 people in 
Louisiana, most of those in the greater New Orleans area.57 Property damage 
was estimated at $108 billion.58 As discussed, almost all of the damage and 
mortality was due to flooding by storm surge getting through or over levees 
and floodwalls. The legal narrative is that the increase in deaths and 
destruction was due to the negligenceat bestof the Corps, and that the 
Corps should pay to make the injured whole. The hurricane protection 
 
 52. Jonkman et al., supra note 47, at 688–98 (the greater the produce of the amount 
water and its velocity, the deadlier the flood). 
 53. Lolita Buckner Inniss, Domestic Right of Return: Race, Rights, and Residency in 
New Orleans in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, A, 27 BC THIRD WORLD L.J. 325 
(2007); Chris Kromm & Sue Sturgis, Hurricane Katrina and the guiding principles on 
internal displacement, 36 INST. FOR S. STUD. 1, 23 (2008). 
 54. Marla Nelson et al., Planning, plans, and people: professional expertise, local 
knowledge, and governmental action in post-hurricane Katrina New Orleans, 9 CITYSCAPE 
23, 29 (2007). By 2015, ten years later, the city had rejected any plans that required not 
rebuilding, even in the highest risk neighborhoods. Richard Campanella, The Great Katrina 
Footprint Debate 10 years later: TIMES-PICAYUNE, https://www.nola.com/katrina/index 
.ssf/2015/05/footprint_gentrification_katri.html (last updated May 29. 2015). 
 55. Miller, supra note 50, at 59–73 n.50. While this study predicts fewer deaths than 
occurred from Hurricane Katrina, it also assumes a 90% evacuation rate of the high-risk parts 
of the city. This is likely unrealistic. 
 56. Estimates range from 81 (Craig E. Colten & Amy R. Sumpter, Social memory and 
resilience in New Orleans, 48 NAT. HAZARDS 355, 358 (2009)) to 75 (Arnold L Sugg, The 
hurricane season of 1965, 94 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 183 (1966)). These are total deaths 
in Louisiana and the number for New Orleans is likely somewhat smaller. 
 57. Brunkard et al., supra note 49, at 2. 
 58. KNABB, supra note 40, at 13. 
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system design put in place after Hurricane Betsy that was breached by 
Hurricane Katrina was designed and constructed by the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers.59 The Orleans levee board shared responsibly for the 
levees and floodwalls within New Orleans.60 The initial class action lawsuit 
for damages due to Hurricane Katrina flooding included the Orleans Levee 
Board and the levee boards for other affected parishes as defendants.61 
During the pendency of the litigation, the claims against the levee boards 
were settled for their aggregate insurance coverage, resulting in payouts of 
about $21,000,000 in total.62 This left the Corps as the primary target of the 
litigation.63 
As a federal agency, the Corps has sovereign immunity from claims,64 
except to the extent that the immunity has been waived by the FTCA65 or 
that the claim is a debt owned by the United States under the Constitution.66 
Cases were filed under the FTCA in the District Court of the Eastern District 
of Louisiana and as a takings claim under the Constitution in the Court of 
Claims. The takings claim case was stayed until after the proceeding in the 
FTCA cases, and relied on the evidence from the FTCA cases.67 Those cases 
are not discussed as part of this paper. 
The FTCA claims are a complex, interrelated set of cases with 
hundreds of orders on the docket.68 All of the FTCA cases were dismissed 
eventually, either under the Flood Control Act of 1928 (FCA) or the FTCA. 
This made no new law. As will be discussed later, the only interesting legal 
point is that they were not dismissed on initial summary judgment. Their 
 
 59. J. David Rogers et al., Interaction between the US Army Corps of Engineers and the 
Orleans Levee Board preceding the drainage canal wall failures and catastrophic flooding of 
New Orleans in 2005, 17 WATER POL’Y 707, 709 (2015). 
 60. Id. 
 61. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 263 F.R.D. 340, 343 (E.D. La. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 62. Id. This initial settlement was rejected on appeal and was replaced by a final 
settlement: Vodanovich v. BOH Bros. Const. Co., LLC, No. CIV.A. 05-4191, 2014 WL 
5603191, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 30, 2014). 
 63. All claims against the Corps have now been dismissed, leaving the settlement by the 
levee boards as the only claims paid through the Hurricane Katrina litigation. 
 64. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). 
 65. 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (2006); see also 28 U.S.C §2680(h): Exemptions. 
 66. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). 
 67. See Tommaseo v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 700, 802–03 (Fed. Cl. 2007). The stay 
was lifted in St. Bernard Parish v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 765, 771–72 (Fed. Cl. 2011), 
and the trial judgment was released in May 2015: St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 
No. 05-1119, 2015 WL 2058969 (Fed. Cl. May 1, 2015), and St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. 
United States, 126 Fed. Cl. 707 (2016). 
 68. 05-CV-4182 Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, E.D. La., http://www.laed.uscourts 
.gov/CanalCases/CanalCases.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2015). 
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significance is the steady state narrative about New Orleans that they 
embedded in the public’s mind and in the record of the takings case. 
The plaintiffs faced three legal hurdles in these cases. First, they had to 
get jurisdiction to sue the United States by satisfying the notice of claim 
requirements in the FTCA. Second, they had to survive the immunity 
provision of the FCA. After New Orleans was flooded by Hurricane Betsy 
in 1965, the Corps was directed to come up with a plan to protect the city. It 
eventually settled on a ring levee system around the city. While some parts 
of the system were still unfinished when Katrina hit, the ring was complete. 
With some very limited exceptions, every piece of property at issue in the 
litigation against the Corps was inside a levee. The flood waters had to get 
over or through a levee to cause damage. 
Section 702c of the FCA provides immunity for flood damage: “No 
liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any 
damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place. . . .”69 Hurricane 
Betsy flooding led to a case holding that a flood control project that does not 
block water still blocks liability.70 The Supreme Court subsequently held 
that it is the “character of the waters that cause the relevant damage”71 that 
triggers immunityif the damage is caused by flood waters, the United 
States is immune. 
Anyone trying to recover from the Corps because Hurricane Katrina 
flooded New Orleans has to get the flood waters over or through the flood 
control projects without triggering § 702c. Finally, they had to avoid 
dismissal under the discretionary authority defense of the FTCA. Some 
failed to perfect their FTCA claim;72 some could not overcome FCA 
immunity;73 and the narrative that was crafted to avoid FCA immunity 
ultimately lead to the dismissal of all of the surviving FTCA cases under the 
statutory discretionary authority defense.74 
A. Exhausting the Federal Torts Claims Act Notice Requirements 
The FTCA is an administrative compensation system for persons 
injured by traditional negligent property and personal injury torts.75 The 
 
 69. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018). 
 70. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 25–26 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 71. Cent. Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 436 (2001). 
 72. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. Civ. A. 05-4182, 2008 WL 
4449970 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2008) (IHNC). For clarity, the parenthetical reference will be 
used at the end of the footnotes in which this case appears. 
 73. In re Katrina, 533 F. Supp. 2d 615 (E.D. La. 2008) (17th Street Canal). 
 74. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436, 444–45 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 
5th Circuit II). 
 75. The FTCA originally allowed plaintiffs to bring their claim directly in District Court. 
This clogged up the courts with claims that could have been settled before trial, so the notice 
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FTCA excludes intentional torts, except some committed by law 
enforcement officers.76 After the administrative claims process has been 
exhausted, the plaintiff has jurisdiction to appeal the agency’s offer of 
settlement or denial of the claim to the district court. This is a simple 
process for individual claims with a clear etiology. As the Katrina cases 
show, it is more difficult to satisfy with tens of thousands of claimants and 
shifting theories of liability. What would have been a straight forward class 
action against a private party becomes a complex procedural problem that 
was never resolved in the litigation. 
The FTCA allows a claimant two years after the incident causing the 
injury to file a claim with the agency that caused the injury. The claim must 
state the name of the claimant and any necessary identifying information so 
that that agency can contact the person. The claim must state the facts 
supporting how the government caused the injury and a specific dollar 
demand.77 The agency has six months to make an offer to settle the claim or 
to reject the claim. The claim can be amended and that restarts the six-
month clock for agency review. Substantive amendments which postulate 
new injuries or different mechanisms of injury must be filed within the 
initial two-year period. Exhaustion is not complete until the agency acts on 
the claim or six months expires after the presentation of the claim. If the 
agency does not act on the claim by six months, it is deemed denied. Once 
the process is exhausted, the claimant has jurisdiction to contest the 
agency’s ruling in federal district court.78 
The claimant has six months to appeal the agency’s denial or 
inadequate award to the district court. The two-year statute of limitation on 
filing the initial claim and the six-month limitation on filing in court can be 
 
provision was added in 1966. See Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub.L. No. 89–506, § 2, 80 Stat. 
(1966); see also Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 288–89 (5th Cir. 1980), decision 
clarified on denial of reh’g, 622 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1980). 
 76. As originally passed, intentional torts were completely excluded. There was 
speculation in a Senate Report that this was because of the inflammatory nature of potential 
beating claims against the FBI. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 547 n.84 
(1947). This left these claims to private bills and the discretion of Congress. But after Bivens 
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422–23 (1971) 
allowed a direct, constitutionally-based action for intentional harm by federal officials, the 
FTCA was amended to its present form to keep these cases within the ambit of the FTCA 
limitations. 
 77. DOJ provides a Form 95 to use for filing claims. The courts have held that the form 
is not required as long as the agency received actual notice. DOJ has promulgated regulations 
that outline the necessary information for stating a claim. 28 C.F.R. § 14.4. 
 78. If the plaintiff files before receiving an offer or denial from the agency and before 
the 6-month “deemed denied” period, the action is premature because there is no jurisdiction. 
The United States can raise this at any point and the action must be dismissed. McNeil v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 106, 108 (1993). 
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equitably tolled for good cause.79 If the claim is deemed denied—if the 
claimant gets no response from the United States—there is no limitations 
period for filing the claim. But if the agency acts on the deemed-denied 
claim at any point in the future, the six-month clock starts ticking. 80 While 
the Court has found that the time periods in the statute are not jurisdictional, 
perfecting the notice of claim is jurisdictional and cannot be waived by the 
courts. 
The court cannot shorten the required timeframes. A complaint filed in 
district court before the agency claims process is complete and the agency 
has had the statutory time to respond is premature and must be dismissed for 
lack of jurisdiction. If the claimant has not filed a claim with the agency 
when the lawsuit is filed, the claim cannot be filed while the lawsuit is 
pending. If the two-year limitations period expires before the lawsuit is 
dismissed and the claim is filed, the claim will be barred. If the claim has 
been filed and the agency has not acted on it, the agency will not proceed 
until the lawsuit is dismissed. This becomes important in the Hurricane 
Katrina FTCA litigation because several lawyers were filing putative class 
actions covering the same potential classes, which potentially complicated 
exhausting the FTCA claims process. 
1. The Exhaustion Issues in the Hurricane Katrina Federal Torts 
Claims Act Litigation 
Hurricane Katrina flooded New Orleans on August 29, 2005, starting 
the two-year clock on FTCA claims. The ensuing FTCA cases posed 
variations of two exhaustion problems: adding additional theories of loss to 
proper claims, and determining if plaintiffs in putative class action lawsuits 
had individually exhausted the FTCA claims process. The original petition 
in what the Court styled the Robinson81 case was filed by six named 
plaintiffs on April 25, 2006.82 Each plaintiff provided proof that a proper 
claim under the FTCA had been filed with the Corps.83 They stated a dollar 
demand for flooding damages and this statement of liability facts: 
 
 79. United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 135 S. Ct. 1625, 1629 (2015). 
 80. Barnes v. United States, 776 F.3d 1134, 1140 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 81. Hurricane Katrina spawned a complex web of litigation. There are several different 
plaintiff groups with different claims against different defendants. The dispute that went to 
trial (In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (E.D. La. 2009)) was 
characterized as the Robinson case by the court and this name was used for the multiple 
orders and preliminary holdings leading up to the final appeals court ruling (In re Katrina 
Canal Breaches Litig., 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012)). 
 82. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. Civ. A. 05-4182, 2008 WL 
4449970, at *1 (E.D. La. Sept. 29, 2008) (IHNC). 
 83. Id. 
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[A]ll of the damage complained of herein were caused as a direct and 
proximate result of negligence of the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers in the design, construction, and maintenance of the 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet navigational/shipping structure located in 
St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes in Louisiana.
84
 
In May 2008, plaintiffs made the court aware that they intended to 
make additional claims based on allegedly negligent work by a government 
contractor associated with the repair of a lock on the IHNC.85 The Court 
found that this was not a logical extension of the original petition and 
ordered plaintiffs to file an amended petition.86 The new Count 3 alleged 
that the Corps was negligent in overseeing a contractor working in “ . . . the 
East Bank Industrial Area (“EBIA”) adjacent to the Inner Harbor 
Navigational Chanel (“IHNC”) or the Industrial Canal.”87 The United States 
filed a motion to dismiss the new count based on failure to provide proper 
notice under the FTCA.88 
The United States argued that it was entitled to notice of the specific 
mechanism of injury that plaintiff intended to rely on and that it did not have 
a duty to look behind the notice and find unnamed negligent acts.89 Plaintiffs 
argued that the statute only requires them to notify the agency of the nature 
of their injury and a proposed mechanism of injury.90 It then becomes the 
agency’s duty to investigate the claim, including other possible mechanisms 
of injury: once the Corps was on notice that plaintiffs had been flooded by 
Hurricane Katrina, it was up to the Corps to find out how it happened.91 
The Court looked to a medical malpractice case, Portillo v. United 
States,92 for guidance on necessary specificity of a claim.93 In Portillo, 
plaintiff’s notice to the agency described an injury caused by negligent post-
op monitoring and urinary catheterization, leading to a urinary tract 
infection and subsequent injury.94 Plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit alleged that 
the injury was due to negligent administration of spinal anesthesia leading to 
spinal nerve damage.95 In determining whether the original notice was 
adequate, the Portillo court looked to the purpose of the administrative 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *2 (IHNC). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at *3 
 89. Id. at *4. 
 90. Id. at *4 
 91. In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *4 (IHNC). 
 92. 816 F. Supp. 444, 446 (W.D. Tex.1993), aff’d, 29 F.3d 624 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 93. In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *5–6 (IHNC). 
 94. Portillo, 816 F. Supp. at 445. 
 95. Id. 
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notice: facilitating the agency’s investigation of the claim to determine if 
there was negligence and, if so, the appropriate compensation.96 The court 
found the information about a post-surgical injury caused by nursing staff 
did not put the agency on notice of an in-surgery injury by anesthesia staff.97 
Based on this reading of the notice requirement, the Robinson court 
found that plaintiff’s Form 95 notice, the form filed with the Corps, did not 
mention any negligence associated with areas described in Count 3: “There 
is simply no indication that the EBIA, and the work of WGI would be the 
subject of this lawsuit.”98 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument 
that since so many other parties had filed claims, someone must have put the 
Corps on notice.99 The court found no case supporting this notion of 
vicarious notice and it was not prepared to find it in this case.100 Since 
plaintiffs failed to perfect notice for the allegations in Count 3, the court 
dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.101 
2. The Class Action Issue and Exhaustion 
The FTCA was meant to deal with individual injuries that occurred 
through pure negligence that is untainted by executive choice or planning—
postal trucks running over dogs, for example—not mass disasters. Mass 
disasters would continue to be dealt with through legislation without regard 
to the fault of the government.102 The United States generally, and 
specifically in these cases, took the position that there cannot be an FTCA 
class action.103 The precedent is not completely clear as to whether there can 
 
 96. Id. at 446. 
 97. Id. at 448. In looking at the medical issues, the court found that these are completely 
different injuries. Id. The only way the agency could have discovered that it was a spinal 
nerve problem would have been to physically examine the plaintiff. Id. 
 98. In re Katrina, 2008 WL 4449970 at *6 (IHNC). 
 99. Id. at *6. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at *7 (finding that even if notice had been perfected, the plaintiffs were barred by 
the statute of limitations from adding a new count based on facts that did not relate back to 
the original filing). 
 102. The primary vehicle for this is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, et seq. “If the President declares a major disaster or 
emergency under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 
1981 (the Stafford Act), then the community becomes eligible for significant federal 
assistance under programs of the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA).” Ernest B. Abbott, Representing Local Governments in 
Catastrophic Events: DHS/FEMA Response and Recovery Issues, 37 URB. L. 467 (2005); see 
also FRANCIS X. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33053, FEDERAL STAFFORD ACT 
DISASTER ASSISTANCE: PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATIONS, ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES, AND FUNDING 
(Summary) (2011). 
 103. United States of America’s Reply in Supp. of Its Mot. to Dismiss & Resp. to the 
Mot’s to Intervene and Consol., In Re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig. Pertains to: 
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be an FTCA class action. The cases that have not categorically ruled out 
FTCA class actions have said that every plaintiff must meet the notice 
requirement.104 Most do not meet the standard, and the ones that met the 
standard look more like multi-party ligation. Thus, everyone who was going 
to be in the class to sue the Corps would have to file a claim that specified 
all the mechanisms of their injury, not just that they were flooded and that it 
was up to the Corps to find out why. The Robinson ruling showed there was 
a significant question as to the adequacy of the notice for many claims. The 
court in the Class Certification Case took the limited position that plaintiffs 
who had complied with the notice requirement could petition for a class 
certification, but that it was not granting class certification at this point.105 
The United States asked for three of the exemplar plaintiffs in the 
MRGO Master Consolidated Class Action Complaint to be dismissed over 
the same notice issue as in the Robinson ruling.106 There was no certified 
class at this point.107 The court’s handling of the motion to dismiss 
highlights the problems of trying to fit FTCA claims into a class action 
structure. First is the confusion over whether notice from a single member of 
a class meets the standard of individualized notice required for an FTCA 
claim for all members of the class: 
Perhaps one of the most confounding problems with the issues before the 
Court is the immensity of notice in general that the Corps certainly had 
 
MRGO., 2009 WL 4068432, text accompanying n.43 (E.D. La.) [hereinafter Notice Case 
Memo Two] (“Throughout the course of this litigation, the United States has steadfastly 
maintained that Rule 23 class actions are incompatible with the FTCA, and that one set of 
plaintiffs cannot institute an action on behalf of other claimants without their express 
permission to do so.”); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. Civ. A. 05-
4182, 2009 WL 1649501, at *2 (E.D. La. June 9, 2009) (Class Certification Case). For 
clarity, the parenthetical reference will be used at the end of the footnote in which this case 
appears. 
 104. Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 227 (8th Cir. 1977) held that a class could 
be certified if there was legal authority to represent all of the potential claimants and there 
was a specific settlement demand for the class. However, plaintiffs did not meet the standard, 
so this was dicta. A later case specifically denied to certify a class unless every claimant had 
complied with the statutory notice requirement. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. 
Supp. 757, 760 (E.D. N.Y. 1980). “Appellants FTCA claims therefore must be dismissed for 
failure to meet the statute’s stringent ‘file first with the agency’ instruction.” Hohri v. United 
States, 782 F.2d 227, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1986) vacated on other grounds, 482 U.S. 64, 75 (1987). 
 105. In re Katrina, 2009 WL 1649501 at *6 (Class Certification Case) (“To be clear, this 
Court’s opinion concludes only that (1) a class action can be maintained against the United 
States under the FTCA if that class is comprised of those who have complied with all of the 
FTCA’s administrative claim requirements. . . . This Court makes no intimation concerning 
the likelihood that Plaintiffs will succeed in certifying the class under Rule 23.”). 
 106. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. CA 05-4182, 2010 WL 487431, at 
*1 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2010) (Notice Case). For clarity, the parenthetical reference will be used 
at the end of the footnote in which this case appears. 
 107. Id. at *14. 
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with respect to these defalcations—that is the failure of the IHNC 
floodwalls allegedly caused by its activities at the EBIA. For example, a 
premature suit was filed by Fred Holmes and Alvin Livers on August 28, 
2006 which states unequivocally the theory of negligence as to the Corps 
and WGI. C.A. 06–5161.108 
The court was clearly unhappy that the Corps wanted to hold each 
claimant to the law’s requirements. The court went against the clear 
precedent that each claimant must meet the notice standard individually on 
the face of the claim filed with the agency. The Corps had no right to waive 
this requirement, but the Court seemed to imply that the Corps should 
effectively waive it at this point by not moving to dismiss. The court also 
expressed its frustration that the Corps did not move to dismiss the claims 
for prematurity and failure of notice when there would have been time for 
the plaintiffs to refile, as if the Corps was tricking the plaintiffs by waiting 
until it was too late to refile before moving to dismiss.109 
The Court’s frustration was driven by the United States’ fundamental 
objection to finding exhaustion for most of the FTCA claims, including the 
ones at issue in the Notice Case. The United States maintained that a 
comprehensive class action lawsuit had been pending since August 2006, 
and that this lawsuit prevented the plaintiffs involved from perfecting 
notice.110 This was based on McNeil v. United States, which looked at 
whether filing a premature lawsuit—a lawsuit filed before exhaustion of the 
FCTA claims process—prevented the claimant from completing the claims 
process.111 Some lower courts had treated premature lawsuits as being on 
hold until the claims process was complete, with the lawsuit being instituted 
when the process was completed.112 The McNeil court rejected this view, 
finding that filing of the lawsuit was the initiation date.113 If this was before 
the claim was presented, the claim had to be dismissed. The plaintiff would 
need to dismiss the lawsuit and refile it within the six-month window or the 
claim would be time barred. 
Since the two-year clock had started on August 29, 2005, potential 
plaintiffs had to file their completed claims by the end of the two years, then 
 
 108. Id. at *18 n.4. 
 109. Id. at *6. It must be noted that never during any of these proceedings did the United 
States ever raise an issue with respect to the prematurity of the filing of the original MRGO 
Master Complaint or that the Form 95s were inadequate so as to deprive the Court of 
jurisdiction over the EBIA claim. 
 110. See Notice Case Memo Two, supra note 104, text accompanying n.103. There was 
more than one complaint filed, extending back to at least April 2006. 
 111. 508 U.S. 106 (1993). 
 112. Id. at 111. 
 113. Id. at 112 (“In its statutory context, we think the normal interpretation of the word 
‘institute’ is synonymous with the words ‘begin’ and ‘commence.’”). 
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wait six months, or until the claim was denied by the agency, to file their 
lawsuit.114 Under the American Pipe standard, when the class action was 
filed, it stopped the administrative process for all the members of the 
class.115 If the potential class members had not individually exhausted the 
FTCA process for their claims before the filing of the class action, they 
could not do so as long as the lawsuit was pending. By August 29,
 
2007, the 
window had closed for filing or substantively amending the administrative 
claims.116 The Notice Case court does not address this argument directly, but 
rejects the notion that the class action prevented Entergy plaintiffs in this 
case from exhausting the FTCA process and does not dismiss their claims.117 
The court never resolved most of the notice issues. It left a class action 
claim pending but no class certification.118 The court had refused to accept 
the plaintiffs’ attorney’s motion to join 30,000 unnamed plaintiffs, holding 
that there was no evidence that each had exhausted the administrative 
process.119 Had the ultimate Robinson court verdict survived the appeals 
process, the United States would have contested jurisdiction for every 
plaintiff, including some in the original exemplar trial. It would also have 
contested using an exemplar trial, demanding that every individual case be 
tried. 
Once the court had accepted that at least some of the cases had 
exhausted the FTCA claims process and had jurisdiction to file suit, the 
court addressed the next hurdle: getting past the immunity provisions of the 
FCA. 
 
 114. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2675 (West, Westlaw through 2018) and 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401 (West, 
Westlaw through 2018). 
 115. Am. Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974) (“We are convinced that 
the rule most consistent with federal class action procedure must be that the commencement 
of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of 
the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class 
action.”). 
 116. The window closed two years after the Hurricane Katrina flooding that is the subject 
of the litigation. 
 117. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., CA No. 05-4182, 2010 WL 487431, at 
*18 (E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2010) (Notice Case). 
 118. Id. at *14 (“The Court has deferred ruling on the certification issue in MRGO. As 
the causation and immunity issues were decided in the Robinson case, until that judgment is 
affirmed, a decision on the class certification is premature. It should be noted that plaintiffs’ 
have also filed a number of “mass joinder” suits which purport to bring individual suits on 
behalf of thousands of claimants.”) Since the appeals court dismissed all the claims, the class 
issues were never resolved, and record is very confusing. 
 119. Id. at *15. 
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B. The Flood Control Act of 1928 
Once satisfied that the plaintiffs in the FTCA cases had exhausted their 
administrative remedies so the court had jurisdiction, the court turned to the 
immunity provisions of the FCA.120 The FCA was passed after the 1927 
Mississippi River flood. The Mississippi has always had major floods.121 As 
with the devastation in New Orleans, the floods became devastating to 
people and property as levees allowed people to live and farm and build 
cities in the river flood plain.122 The Corps laid out the basic framework for 
navigation and flood control for the Mississippi River in an 1861 report.123 
The Civil War began as the report was released and delayed action on the 
plan for several years.124 On April 26, 1876, the Mississippi River changed 
course, stranding the important port of Vicksburg and the Corps’s 
headquarters there.125 Stabilizing the river and building a new channel to 
Vicksburg began the comprehensive control of the Mississippi River that 
continues to this day.126 The FCA was one of a series of flood control acts 
passed to implement this plan.127 
Major river flood control projects share the levee effect problem with 
coastal flood control. It has the additional problem that the huge volume of 
water in a major flood—many cubic miles of water—cannot be contained 
with ever-higher levee walls. The system has to have safety valves called 
“fuse plug levees” and spillways that divert water from the river into 
floodways that allow water to flood areas where people will not be 
endangered and where there will be little property damage.128 Keeping the 
 
 120. See 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018). 
 121. Matthew D. Therrell & Margaret B. Bialecki, A multi-century tree-ring record of 
spring flooding on the Mississippi River, 529 J. HYDROLOGY 490, Table I (2015). 
 122. A. A. HUMPHREYS & H. L. ABBOT, REPORT UPON THE PHYSICS AND HYDRAULICS OF 
THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER: UPON THE PROTECTION OF THE ALLUVIAL REGION AGAINST OVERFLOW; 
AND UPON THE DEEPENING OF THE MOUTHS (JB Lippincott & Co., 1861), https://archive.org 
/details/reportuponphysi00abbogoog/page/n9. 
 123. Id. 
 124. JAMES M. WRIGHT, ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, THE NATION’S 
RESPONSES TO FLOOD DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 5 (Wendy L. Hessler ed., 2000). 
 125. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 218 (1904). 
 126. Christopher Morris, Reckoning with “the Crookedest River in the World”: The Maps 
of Harold Norman Fisk, 52 S. Q. 30, 31–32 (2015). 
 127. See Jackson v. United States, 230 U.S. 1, 3–8 (1913) for a history of Mississippi 
flood control efforts before the passage of the FCA 
 128. United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 261–62 (1939) (“The 1928 Act here 
involved accepted the conceptionunderlying the plan of General Jadwin of the Army 
Engineersthat levees alone would not protect the valley from floods. Upon the assumption 
that there might be floods of such proportions as to overtop the river’s banks and levees 
despite all the Government could do, this plan was designed to limit to predetermined points 
such escapes of floodwaters from the main channel. The height of the levees at these 
predetermined points was not to be raised to the general height of the levees along the river. 
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river from flooding one area often results in it flooding a different area.129 
For example, Mississippi River flood control started with levees on the main 
channel.130 The levees allow the flooding river to get higher than the level of 
its tributaries, causing them to back up and flood upstream of where they 
enter the main river.131 Section 702c of the FCA makes it clear that the if the 
government was going to spend federal money building a flood control 
system, it was not going to be subject to legal claims over the zero sum 
decisions involved in river flood control.132 
Section 702c of the FCA states, “No liability of any kind shall attach to 
or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by floods or flood 
waters at any place.”133 At the time this was passed, it might be best seen as 
a policy statement, rather than an important legal limit on claims. Prior to 
the conditional waiver of sovereign immunity by the FTCA, the only claims 
allowed against the United States for flood related claims were takings cases 
under the Constitution. As constitutional claims, they were not affected by § 
702c. The passage of the FTCA created a vehicle for bringing claims that 
implicated § 702c. The Eighth Circuit in National Manufacturing Company 
v. United States held that the FTCA did not abrogate § 702c, finding that the 
FTCA preempted only the specific list of laws that were part of its text.134 
Once the National Manufacturing court found that the § 702c 
immunity was still intact, it had to determine if immunity extended beyond 
flood control projects. The plaintiffs claimed that the United States was 
negligent by failing to provide adequate information about the flood levels 
of the river that subsequently flooded plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs 
attempted to avoid § 702c by not making any claims about the levees or the 
 
These lower points for possible flood spillways were designated ‘fuse plug levees.’ Flood 
waters diverted over these lower ‘fuse plug levees’ were intended to relieve the main river 
channel and thereby prevent general flooding over the higher levees along the banks.”). 
 129. Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217, 217–18 (1904). Stabilizing the river after 
Vicksburg was cut off led to litigation by land owners who argued that keeping the river from 
further advancing in its new course flooded their land. The court found that the Corps was not 
liable for a taking because their efforts to protect on part of the river bank increased the 
flooding on another part. 
 130. William Murray Black, The Problem of the Mississippi, 224 N. AM. REV. 630, 630 
(1927). 
 131. This is known as backwater flooding. 
 132. But cf. Stover v. United States, 332 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1964) (“It may be that 
morally and financially the plaintiffs have been grievously wronged by their government; that 
in protecting others it injured them. It is not committed to us to remake the statute. That the 
limitation should happen to be in the statute is understandable. Appropriations for flood 
control do not come automatically. Dozens of congressmen have no flood control problems. 
Perhaps, as a condition to their consent to flood control appropriations, they impose such 
limitations as § 702c.”). 
 133. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018). 
 134. 210 F.2d 263, 278 (8th Cir. 1954). 
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flood control program.135 The court found that the FCA represented a core 
policy decision by Congress: 
Undoubtedly that absolute freedom of the government from liability for 
flood damages is and has been a factor of the greatest importance in the 
extent to which congress has been and is willing to make appropriations 
for flood control and to engage in costly undertakings to reduce flood 
damage.
136
 
The National Manufacturing court held that the key to understanding § 
702c is determining whether the damage is caused by flood waters, not the 
mechanism of the damage.137 In this case, the alleged mechanism was faulty 
river stage reporting, but actual damage was caused by flood waters.138 
While the flood damages were only an indirect effect of the claimed 
negligence, the court found the only legal question is whether the damages 
were caused by flood waters.139 If so, the United States is immune.140 The 
court is clear that immunity extends to any damages caused directly or 
indirectly by flood waters, without regard to negligence or the presence or 
absence of flood control structures: 
The language used shows Congressional anticipation that it will be 
claimed after the happening of floods that negligence of government 
employees was a proximate cause of damages where floods or flood 
waters have destroyed or damaged goods. But the section prohibits 
government liability of ‘any kind’ and at ‘any place’. So that uniformly 
and throughout the country at any place where there is damage ‘from’ or 
‘by’ a flood or flood waters in spite of and notwithstanding federal flood 
control works no liability of any kind may attach to or rest upon the 
United States therefor.
141
 
 
 135. Id. at 269. 
 136. Id. at 271. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 270. 
 139. Id. at 271. 
 140. Nat’l Mfg., 210 F.2d at 271 (“The section does not limit the bar against such 
recovery to cases where floods or flood waters are the sole cause of damages. It does bar 
liability of any kind from damages ‘by’ floods or flood waters but it goes further and in 
addition it bars liability for damages that result (even indirectly) ‘from’ floods.”). 
 141. Id.; see also Stover v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 477, 483 (N.D. Cal. 1962) (“[I]t is 
of no consequence how negligent the Government may (or may not) have been, if it be shown 
that the inundations, even in part, resulted from, and were actually caused by, such natural 
forces.”); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp., 126 F. Supp. 406, 408 
(N.D. Cal. 1954) (“[T]his Court is of the opinion that [§ 702c’s] purpose was to prevent the 
Government from being held liable for the staggering amount of damage caused by natural 
floods, merely because the Government had embarked upon a vast program of flood 
control.”). 
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1. The New Orleans Flood Control Act Jurisprudence 
The first major hurricane to flood New Orleans after the FTCA was 
passed was the 1947 Hurricane.142 It caused severe flooding in New Orleans 
in many of the same areas as Katrina, in particular the Ninth Ward.143 The 
next major flood was Hurricane Betsy in 1965: “Vast areas of Orleans, 
Plaquemines, and St. Bernard Parishes were inundated by the tidal surge that 
accompanied the storm. This surge either overtopped or breached the non-
Federal levee protecting these areas.”144 In Graci v. United States,145 
plaintiffs on the east side of New Orleans who had been flooded by 
Hurricane Betsy filed an FTCA complaint in the District Court of the 
Eastern District of Louisiana claiming that negligent construction of the 
MRGO caused their homes to flood.146 Forty years later, effectively the 
same claims were made in the same court after Hurricane Katrina. 
The district court in Graci recognized § 702c immunity for flood 
control projects, but drew a distinction between flood control projects and 
navigation projects. The court recognized the policy behind protecting the 
government from liability for flooding related to flood control programs, but 
reads navigation projects out of § 702c protection: 
There may be a valid governmental interest in avoiding liability for 
floods in connection with navigation improvement projects; the great 
public interest served by these projects might be inhibited by a 
willingness of courts to permit what could well become an avalanche of 
suits in such cases. But we do not think that such an interest, absent its 
expression in positive law, warrants the complete and absolute 
prohibition of all suits against the government for floodwater damage in 
the face of the more liberal policy of the Federal Tort Claims Act. We 
think the public interest in navigation improvements and in the 
avoidance to that end of burdensome litigation is better served, 
consistent with the policy considerations of the FTCA, by an equitable 
approach which might severely inhibit suits for flood damage, but at the 
same time leave certain avenues open for action in cases of flagrant 
wrongdoing.
147
 
 
 142. While hurricane naming was not formally adopted until late, this hurricane was also 
known as Hurricane George. H.C. Sumner, North Atlantic hurricanes and tropical 
disturbances of 1947, 75 MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 251, 252 (1947); see also ROTH, supra 
note 15, at 36. 
 143. Horowitz, supra note 29, at 901. 
 144. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, REPORT ON HURRICANE BETSY 8 (1965), http://www. 
iwr.usace.army.mil/docs/hpdc/docs/19651100_Hurricane_Betsy.pdf. 
 145. 301 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. La. 1969) aff’d and remanded, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 146. Id. at 949. 
 147. Graci, 301 F. Supp. at 955. 
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This ignores the plain language of § 702c, “No liability of any kind 
shall attach to or rest upon the United States for any damage from or by 
floods or flood waters at any place,”148 and substitutes immunity that is 
limited to flood control structures but not navigation projects. The Fifth 
Circuit in Graci149 also assumed that the MRGO was a conduit that allowed 
storm surge from Hurricane Betsy to flood eastern New Orleans and St. 
Bernard Parish.150 The appeals court asked “[w]hether it is reasonable to 
suppose that in exchange for its entry into flood control projects the United 
States demanded complete immunity from liability for the negligent and 
wrongful acts of its employees unconnected with flood control projects.”151 
The court looked to Peterson v. United States for guidance.152 Peterson 
arose from dynamiting a natural ice dam on a river in Alaska by military 
personnel.153 When the blasting broke up the dam, it caused a massive flood 
downstream, flooding plaintiffs’ property.154 The lower court dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims based on reading § 702c as barring all claims due to 
damage by flood waters.155 The appeals court in Peterson looked to whether 
the damage was related to a congressional appropriation for flood control, 
rather than to the nature of the flood waters.156 The court found that the 
flooding was not the result of a flood control plan done at the direction of 
Congress, but that it was a decision to “alleviate and control the flood waters 
in an attempt to prevent further damage in the Badger Road Area at Ladd 
Air Force Base, and in the Fairbanks area.”157 Thus, the court found that 
despite being a flood control measure, the dynamiting was not covered by § 
702c immunity.158 
Based on the Peterson holding, the appeals court in Graci concluded 
that it would be unreasonable to assume that Congress intended for FCA 
immunity to reach projects that were not designed for flood control.159 
 
 148. 33 U.S.C. § 702c (2018). 
 149. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 150. Id. at 22. 
 151. Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added). 
 152. 367 F.2d 271 (9th Cir. 1966). 
 153. Id. at 272. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Peterson v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 867, 873 (D. Alaska 1963) (“The water and 
ice which damaged the plaintiff’s vessels on May 3, 1960, were a part of a flood, within the 
meaning of the terms ‘floods or flood waters’ as used in Title 33 U.S.C.A. § 702c. Section 
702c of Title 33 U.S.C.A. therefore provides the defendant, United States of America, with a 
complete legal defense to this action.”). 
 156. Peterson, 367 F.2d at 275 (“The decision to dynamite the ice jam was wholly 
unrelated to any Act of Congress authorizing expenditures of federal funds for flood control, 
or any act undertaken pursuant to any such authorization.”). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 276. 
 159. Graci v. United States, 456 F.2d 20, 26–27 (5th Cir. 1971).. 
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Because MRGO was strictly a navigation canal, the court ruled that § 702c 
did not apply and remanded so that the FTCA case could go forward.160 This 
ruling ignored the symmetry of flood control decisions: flood control plans 
are as much about which levees and structures are not built as those that are 
built. By abrogating immunity for flooding related to navigation systems, 
Graci opens the Corps to liability for flood damage associated with any 
Corps project not defined as a flood control project. This could force the 
Corps to build flood control systems on all Corps-constructed navigation 
systems that could flood land that would not otherwise have flooded.161 On 
remand, the district court found that the MRGO was properly constructed 
and dismissed the claims.162 Since the United States prevailed, no appeal 
was taken on the construction of the FCA. 
2. The Supreme Court Reviews § 702c after Graci 
While a number of cases cite Graci, none actually follow its holding, 
and all of them abrogate § 702c immunity for damages caused by flood 
waters in the absence of a flood control structure.163 The United States 
Supreme Court first looked at § 702c in United States v. James.164 This 
Louisiana case arose from recreational water users who were injured or 
killed when the Corps negligently operated floodgates.165 James upheld a 
broad reading of § 702c, finding ample support in the legislative history for 
extending its reach beyond property claims and applying it to recreational 
 
 160. Id. at 27–28. 
 161. To protect against future flooding, the Corps built the flood control levees between 
the MRGO and all the populated areas of New Orleans and St. Bernard Parish. Mark 
Schleifstein, Upgraded metro New Orleans levees will greatly reduce flooding, even in 500-
year storms, NOLA (Aug. 16, 2013), https://www.nola.com/hurricane/index.ssf/2013/08/ 
upgrated_metro_new_orleans_lev.html. 
 162. Graci v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 189, 196 (E.D. La. 1977). 
 163. See, e.g., United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 612 (1986) (following a “plain 
language” approach to interpreting § 702c); Lunsford v. United States, 570 F.2d 221, 229 
(8th Cir. 1977) (discussing differences between National Manufacturing and Graci, but 
ultimately remanding because of ripeness considerations); Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United 
States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1191 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying § 702c to “‘floods or flood waters’ in 
connection with flood control projects” (quoting Graci, 456 F.2d at 25–27)); Britt v. United 
States, 515 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (M.D. Ala. 1981) (“The United States’ flood immunity is not 
limited to that resulting from its actions taken in connection with such physical flood control 
structures as dams, dikes and levees.”); for additional cases which distinguish Graci, see 
Mocklin v. Orleans Levee Dist., 877 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1989); Callaway v. United 
States, 568 F.2d 684, 686–87 (10th Cir. 1978); Morici Corp. v. United States, 491 F. Supp. 
466, 473 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Ledford v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 204, 205 (W.D. Okla. 
1977). 
 164. James, 478 U.S. at 597. 
 165. Id. at 599. 
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users of a flood control lake who were injured by flood waters.166 Since 
James had both flood waters and a flood control structure, it did not need to 
clarify Graci. 
The second, and most recent, United States Supreme Court case to look 
at § 702c is Central Green Co. v. United States.167 Central Green deals with 
a regional irrigation system in California.168 This was a combined flood 
control and irrigation system fed by natural streams.169 When these streams 
were flooded, the system would function as a flood control system.170 Thus, 
parts of the system might channel both flood and normal (irrigation) flow.171 
The plaintiff was a pistachio grower who argued that seepage through the 
walls of the canal near his orchards led to subsurface flooding.172 This 
damaged his orchard and increased his operating costs.173 He argued 
negligence in the design, construction, and maintenance of the canal, but 
made no claims that dams or flood control structures were at fault.174 
The government argued that it should be immune from damages if any 
part of the system was related to flood control.175 The lower courts agreed, 
dismissing the claim.176 The Supreme Court shared the discomfort of the 
lower courts in the breadth of the immunity claimed by the United States, 
quoting the Ninth Circuit’s opinion that, under such a test, there would seem 
to be no “set of facts where the government is not immune from damage 
arising from water that at one time passed through part of the Central Valley 
or other flood control project.”177 
Ignoring Graci, the Court looked at how other previous cases had used 
the nexus with a flood control structure to narrow the exceptions, noting that 
“some courts have focused on whether the damage relates in some, often 
tenuous, way to a flood control project, rather than whether it relates to 
 
 166. Id. at 612 (“It is true that during the debates on the Act, several Congressmen used 
the terms ‘liability’ and ‘damage’ to refer only to property damage caused by the construction 
of the flood control projects. But . . . there are numerous passages in the legislative history 
that emphasize the intention of Congress to protect the Federal Government from any 
damages liability that might arise out of flood control”). 
 167. 531 U.S. 425 (2001). 
 168. Id. at 427. 
 169. Id. at 427; see also id. at 434. 
 170. Id. at 427–28, 436. 
 171. Id. at 427–28, 436. 
 172. Id. at 427. 
 173. Central Green Co., 531 U.S. at 427. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 436. 
 176. Id. at 427–28. 
 177. Id. at 428 (quoting Central Green Co. v. United States, 177 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 
1999)). 
2018] DENIAL OF GEOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 723 
‘floods or flood waters.’”178 The Court noted that while this distinction was 
used in James, it was dictum since the damages were caused by flood 
waters.179 The Court then looked to the vast size of the Central Valley 
irrigation system and found that characterizing every drop of water that 
flowed through the system as flood water “unnecessarily dilutes the 
language of the statute.”180 To narrow the scope of § 702c, the Court held: 
Accordingly, the text of the statute directs us to determine the scope of 
the immunity conferred, not by the character of the federal project or the 
purposes it serves, but by the character of the waters that cause the 
relevant damage and the purposes behind their release. 
. . . [I]n determining whether § 702c immunity attaches, courts should 
consider the character of the waters that cause the relevant damage rather 
than the relation between that damage and a flood control project.
181
 
The Court recognized that its analysis repudiated the broad dicta in 
James.182 The Court also recognized that while it is usually simple to tell if a 
single release of water is flood water, the damage in this case stretched over 
years.183 During some of that time there might have been flood water in the 
canal, but most of the time the water would be irrigation water not subject to 
§ 702c immunity.184 The lower court’s dismissal was reversed, and the case 
was remanded to determine the character of the water that caused the 
damage.185 Central Green appears to implicitly overrule Graci’s focus on 
flood control structures as a predicate to § 702c immunity, but it does not 
specifically address Graci. There is only limited additional construction of 
Central Green as applied to flood water damage before the Hurricane 
Katrina cases, and none by the Supreme Court.186 
 
 178. Id. at 430 (quoting Washington v. E. Columbia Basin Irrigation Dist., 105 F.3d 517, 
519 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 179. Central Green Co., 531 U.S at 431. 
 180. Id. at 433–34. 
 181. Id. at 434, 437. 
 182. Id. at 436. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Central Green Co., 531 U.S at 437. 
 186. Downs v. United States, No. 06-20861-CIV-HUCK, 2007 WL 842136, at *4 (S.D. 
Fla. Mar. 20, 2007) rev’d on other grounds sub nom (holding that beach renourishment 
projects are not flood control structures, and the ocean absent a storm is not flood water); 
Downs v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 333 F. App’x 403 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that TVA 
dams are entitled to § 702c immunity); Fortner v. Tenn. Valley Auth., No. 3:04-CV-363, 
2005 WL 2922190, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2005) (case remanded to determine if the river 
was flooding); Poindexter v. United States, No. CIV.A.04-1035, 2005 WL 6169020, at *9 
(W.D. La. Dec. 9, 2005), rev’d, 244 F. App’x 561 (5th Cir. 2007). 
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3. Flood Control Act Immunity in Robinson187 
The Robinson plaintiffs’ complaint is structured to avoid § 702c 
immunity by building on Graci. They argued that the Corps was negligent in 
the construction and post-construction maintenance of the MRGO.188 
Gracidecided by the same court decades earlierfound that the MRGO 
had nothing to do with flood control; thus, § 702c did not apply. The 
plaintiffs in both cases argued that the MRGO funneled storm surge into the 
city, exacerbating flooding of the same areas, occupied in some cases by the 
same people. The difference is that the Corps built flood control levees 
between the city and the MRGO after the flooding in 1965.189 Even reading 
Central Green to preserve Graci, it would seem that the confluence of flood 
waters from Hurricane Katrina breaching flood control structures should 
trigger § 702c immunity. 
The United States moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that § 702c preserved its sovereign immunity 
despite the FTCA and thus the court did not have jurisdiction because 
plaintiffs’ claims were all rooted in damage caused by floodwaters.190 The 
court analyzed this under Graci, its own decision from 1971, decided long 
before Central Green and its focus on flood waters rather than flood 
control.191 Mirroring Graci, the court found that since plaintiffs were only 
claiming damages from negligence related to MRGO, they were not barred 
by § 702c immunity.192 As for the problem of the damages being caused by 
flood waters going through or over flood control structures, the court 
analogized the flood waters to a Navy ship, breaking through the levee 
because it was negligently moored: 
 
 187. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 471 F. Supp. 2d 684, 687 (E.D. La. 
2007). 
 188. Id. at 686–87 (E.D. La. 2007) (“These pleadings have been lodged in Robinson, et 
al. v. United States, in which a Complaint for Damages Caused by the Design, Construction, 
Operation and Maintenance of the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (“MRGO”)1 (Doc. 1) was 
filed pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq. against the 
United States of America and the United States Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) by 
six named plaintiffs living in New Orleans East, St. Bernard Parish, 687 and the Lower Ninth 
Ward in Louisiana arising from these areas’ inundation as a consequence of Hurricane 
Katrina.”); see also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 677 
(E.D. La. 2009) (Robinson), rev’d on other grounds, 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 
5th Circuit II). 
 189. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 651–52 (Robinson). By 1962, these levees had 
been planned, but construction was not completed until after Hurricane Betsy flooded New 
Orleans in 1965. 
 190. In re Katrina, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 687. 
 191. Id. at 691. 
 192. Id. at 694. 
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For example, would the United States be immune for all damages if a 
Navy vessel lost control and broke through [a] levee where the sole 
cause of the failure of that levee was the Navy vessel’s negligence? 
Thus, contrary to the Government’s contention that Central Green 
broadens the immunity provided by [§] 702c, in reality Central Green 
requires the Court to identify the cause of the damage rather than base a 
decision on the mere fact that a flood control project was involved. 
Central Green does not directly answer the question of what nexus to a 
flood control project is required for floodwaters to trigger immunity.
193
 
The court goes on to say that the instant case is “very much like” 
Central Green: “while arguably the immediate cause of the damage was 
indeed ‘floodwaters,’ the caus[e] for such floodwaters[‘] force and breadth 
[is] alleged to have been the defalcations of the Government with respect to 
the MRGO.”194 It does not elaborate on why this case is like Central Green, 
whose factual question on remand was the characterization of the waters, 
not the defalcations of the Government in regard to the canal in that case.195 
By ignoring Central Green’s clear statement that the courts should look to 
the “character of the waters”196 and looking instead at the nature of the 
damage, the court read the importance of the flood waters out of its § 702c 
analysis and denied summary judgment on the § 702c motion. By denying 
immunity, the court shifted the focus from the law to the Corps. 
4. 17
th
 Street Canal Cases 
After rejecting the government’s motion for summary judgment on 
FCA immunity in Robinson, the district court turned to 17
th
 Street Canal, a 
case dealing with damage claims from the failure of the flood wall on the 
17
th
 Street Canal, which is a drainage canal for pumping floodwater out of 
the city.197 While called canals, these structures more closely resemble open 
aqueducts. The 17
th
 Street Canal starts in the heart of New Orleans, where 
the land is down to ten feet below sea level.198 The water in the canal flows 
by gravity to Lake Pontchartrain, so the bottom of the canal has to be high 
 
 193. Id. at 695. 
 194. Id. Reading this section of Central Green in light of Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
210 F.2d 263, 271 (8th Cir. 1954), one could conclude that the government would be immune 
from damages for just such a negligently moored Navy vessel if it was carried through the 
levee by flood waters. 
 195. Central Green Co., 531 U.S. 425, 436 (2001). 
 196. Id. at 437. 
 197. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (E.D. La. 
2008) (17th Street Canal). 
 198. RICHARD P. MCCULLOH ET AL., GEOLOGY AND HURRICANE-PROTECTION STRATEGIES 
IN THE GREATER NEW ORLEANS AREA 13, Table 1, LSU (2006), https://www.lsu.edu 
/lgs/publications/products/Free_publications/Geo-Hurricane-Protection-StrategiesNO.pdf. 
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enough above sea level to slope to the outfall at Lake Pontchartrain and still 
be above sea level at the end. The water is pumped from the sump formed 
by the subsided land up a pipe into the overhead canal.199 Since the bottom 
of the canal has to be above sea level, it will be more than 10 feet above 
ground level in the areas that are 10 feet below sea level, and the walls of 
the canal will be many feet higher. 
The drainage canals are open to the Lake and did not have flood gates 
that could be closed during periods of elevated sea level from storms.200 
When Hurricane Katrina’s surge raised the level of Lake Pontchartrain 
several feet, the water backed up into the canals.201 The pressure caused the 
concrete and sheet pile flood wall forming the New Orleans side of the canal 
to fail, flooding a large area of the northern part of the city.202 
Much of the 17
th
 Street Canal opinion recited the plaintiffs’ detailed 
history of the New Orleans hurricane protection plan, which began after 
Hurricane Betsy in 1965.203 The plaintiffs presented various theories of 
negligence in the design and construction of the levees and flood walls, 
including decisions by the Corps to allow dredging near the canal, which 
might have weakened it.204 The government moved to dismiss, arguing that 
§ 702c grants immunity for any damage caused by flood waters.205 
The court reiterated its position from Robinson that Graci is the 
controlling law.206 The court made clear that it thought the Corps was 
negligent in the design of the hurricane protection system, noting that “the 
facts surrounding the [Hurricane Protection Plan] in relation to the outfall 
canals is checkered and replete with what appears to be errors in 
 
 199. CHRISTINE F. ANDERSEN ET AL., AM. SOC’Y CIV. ENG’RS, THE NEW ORLEANS 
HURRICANE PROTECTION SYSTEM: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHY: A REPORT 22 (2007), 
https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/reports/erpreport.pdf. 
 200. Id. at 619–20. Since rainwater still needs to be pumped out when the lake is high, 
expensive pumps would be needed to raise the water over the floodgates and into the lake. 
These were added as part of the post-Katrina flood control updates. 
 201. See generally M. Rajabalinejad et al., Probabilistic Assessment of the Flood Wall at 
17th Street Canal, New Orleans, in RISK, RELIABILITY AND SOCIETAL SAFETY 2227 (Terje 
Aven & Jan Erik Vinnem eds., 2007), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 
10.1.1.189.1579&rep=rep1&type=pdf (advocating a probabilistic method for estimating the 
failure of flood defenses). 
 202. Id. 
 203. See In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 533 F. Supp. 2d 615, 619–28 (E.D. 
La. 2008) (17th Street Canal). 
 204. Id. at 628. 
 205. Id. at 633. 
 206. Id. at 634 (“This Court has previously rejected the United States’ contention that it is 
immune from damages for any floodwater regardless of its source in its ruling on a motion to 
dismiss before as seen in Robinson and will continue to do so until otherwise guided by a 
higher court.”). 
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judgment.”207 It then went on to find that Congress authorized and funded 
the Corps’s plan, and that this made it clear that the 17th Street Canal was 
solely a flood control structure.208 With both conditions of Graci met for 
invoking § 702c immunity, the court had no choice but to grant the motion 
to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims.209 Nonetheless, the judge expressed disapproval 
of the law: 
When Congress grants immunity to the “sovereign” and that immunity is 
interpreted as it has been by the Supreme Court in James and Central 
Green, in essence, the King can do no wrong if the facts of the case 
compel the Court to apply that immunity. Here, the Court must apply 
this broad immunity based upon the facts of this case. Often, when the 
King can do no wrong, his subjects suffer the consequences. Such is the 
case here.
210
 
5. The Discretionary Authority Exception 
The Robinson plaintiffs who exhausted their administrative notice 
under the FTCA and survived FCA immunity then filed a tort claim against 
the Corps, and, pursuant to the FTCA, the United States was substituted for 
the Corps as the defendant. Since there is no federal common law of torts, 
the FTCA specifies that the tort law of the state where the incident occurred 
is used to determine the prima facie case for a claim.211 There is no jury, 
which is consistent with the judicial review of agency adjudications. The 
courts use a preponderance of the evidence standard, rather than arbitrary 
and capricious standard from the Administrative Procedure Act for 
reviewing factual decisions by agencies.212 There is no deference to the 
agency on the record; the courts try the case like an ordinary tort case, with 
 
 207. Id. at 637. 
 208. Id. at 638. The judge apparently does not believe in discretionary authority, 
otherwise the approval of Congress would not be relevant to assessing the Corps’ decision. 
 209. In re Katrina, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 643. 
 210. Id. at 638. 
 211. Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 305 (1992). 
 212. Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 482 (1951) (“(e) Scope of 
Review.—So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall . . . 
(B) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without observance of 
procedure required by law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in any case subject to the 
requirements of sections 7 and 8 or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute; or (6) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to 
trial de novo by the reviewing court. In making the foregoing determinations the court shall 
review the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party, and due 
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.”) (citing 5 U.S.C. s 1009(e)). 
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a de novo review of the facts.213 The deference is manifested through the 
statutory discretionary authority exception to the waiver of sovereign 
immunity: 
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not 
apply to (a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of 
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or 
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based 
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be 
abused.
214
 
The clearest limitation of this defense is that the agency cannot decide 
to violate applicable statutes or regulations. For example, a regulatory 
agency can choose to inspect a sample of regulated airplanes, rather than 
inspecting every airplane.215 But if the agency requires that every item be 
inspected, as the FDA did with its rule that required testing every batch of 
polio vaccine, it cannot do spot-checking. It is not within the discretion of an 
agency to violate its own rules, even if the rule was not required by 
statute.216 
Dalehite v. United States, 217 the first United States Supreme Court 
decision to interpret discretionary function defense, was also about a 
massive Gulf Coast disaster. Two ships carrying fertilizer to Europe under 
the Marshall Plan exploded in the port, destroying the center of Texas City, 
Texas, and killing 500 to 600 people.218 The United States was sued for 
negligence leading to the explosion.219 The Dalehite court looked to the 
extensive legislative history of the FTCA to determine how far Congress 
intended to go with the waiver of sovereign immunity. It was clear that a 
prime objective was to find a better way to deal with paying damages for 
routine vehicle accident damage, which, prior to the FTCA, were paid by 
 
 213. Typically, the only record from the agency is a bare denial or a monetary offer, or, in 
these cases, no answer at all. 
 214. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (West, Westlaw through 2018). 
 215. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 
U.S. 797, 820 (1984) (“It follows that the acts of FAA employees in executing the “spot-
check” program in accordance with agency directives are protected by the discretionary 
function exception as well.”) 
 216. Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 548 (1988). 
 217. 346 U.S. 15, 17 (1953). 
 218. GAINES M. FOSTER, CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY, U.S. ARMY, THE DEMANDS OF 
HUMANITY: ARMY MEDICAL DISASTER RELIEF 131 (1983), https://history.army.mil/html/ 
books/040/40-3/CMH_Pub_40-3.pdf. 
 219. Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15, 23 (1953) (“The negligence charged was that the United 
States, without definitive investigation of FGAN properties, shipped or permitted shipment to 
a congested area without warning of the possibility of explosion under certain conditions.”). 
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passing private bills through Congress.220 The “due care” clause clearly 
ruled out the negligent operation of a vehicle under state law as subject to 
discretion. At the other extreme, Congress did not want to create an avenue 
for judicial review of executive policy decisions: 
This paragraph characterizes the general exemption as ‘a highly 
important exception, intended to preclude any possibility that the bill 
might be construed to authorize suit for damages against the Government 
growing out of authorized activity, such as a flood control or irrigation 
project, where no negligence on the part of any government agent is 
shown, and the only ground for the suit is the contention that the same 
conduct by a private individual would be tortious . . . . The bill is not 
intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide 
a remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently 
performed and involving an abuse of discretion.’221 
This paragraph captures the two core ideas of the discretionary function 
defense. The first is common senseallowing the judiciary to second guess 
executive policy decisions where there is no negligence would fatally 
undermine separation of powers. The second, protecting negligent decisions, 
is more nuanced. The first reason that negligent decisions should not be 
subject to tort claims is that it would provide the courts a way to question all 
decisions, because every decision would be fair game for review until it was 
found to be non-negligent. The second reason is that decisionmakers should 
not be worrying about whether they will be questioned about the 
consequences of their actions in court. Even though the United States is 
substituted for the individual defendant and pays the damages, the individual 
would still have to be deposed and examined as a witness, and what 
bureaucrat would want to attract that level of scrutiny of his or her actions? 
(One of the ironies of Hurricane Katrina was that it was Mayor Nagin of 
New Orleans’s misunderstanding of the legal notion of discretionary 
immunity that delayed the evacuation order for New Orleans).222 
The Congressional report noted an obvious consequence of this 
exception: the same actions protected by the exemption would be actionable 
if done by a private person. This is where litigating an FTCA claim diverges 
from litigating a private tort action. In private tort actions, the plaintiff wants 
to make the defendant appear as culpable as possible to sway the emotions 
 
 220. Id. at 28. 
 221. Id. at 30. 
 222. DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, 
AND THE MISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 22–23 (Morrow 2006) (“Nagin said late Saturday that he’s 
having his legal staff look into whether he can order a mandatory evacuation of the city,” 
Bruce Nolan reported in the Times-Picayune, “a step he’s been hesitant to do because of the 
potential liability on the part of the city for closing hotels and other businesses.”). 
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of the judge or jury, increasing the chance of a verdict for the plaintiff and a 
bigger award of damages. The more the plaintiff can show that the 
defendant knew about the danger of his actions, the more those actions 
appear intentionally harmful, the stronger the plaintiff’s case.223 This same 
showing in an FTCA case assures a dismissal. 
The next major case, another mass tort case, is Allen.224 In Allen, the 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) authorized above ground nuclear bomb 
testing in Nevada.225 Plaintiffs were exposed to significant radiation from 
nuclear fallout and suffered real and ongoing injuries.226 The plaintiffs 
proved that the government knowingly chose to do above ground nuclear 
weapons testing, knowing it would expose communities downwind to 
dangerous nuclear fallout, which did in fact cause injuries.227 The plaintiffs 
conceded that these high-level decisions were subject to the discretionary 
authority exception.228 Their claim was that the government was negligent in 
the lower-level decisions on whether to warn the public and to provide 
information about precautions against radiation injury.229 
The district court looked to a list of Atomic Energy Commission 
recommendations for radiologic risk warnings, mitigation measures, and 
monitoring as evidence as setting a standard.230 It claimed it could not find 
any explicit decision to not follow these guidelines because of public policy 
or national security considerations. 231 It held that it was not whether the 
United States had made the decision to use these measures—which it clearly 
did since it knew about them and did not use them—but that the government 
had not provided some specific policy rational for the decision.232 
In dismissing the action under the discretionary function exception, the 
appeals court found that the discretionary function exception is strongest 
when the government knowingly puts people and property at risk. The 
appeals court was clear that this showing did not trigger liability: 
 
 223. The only situation where this is not advisable is when the plaintiff is depending on 
the defendant’s insurance or a third party to pay the award and the indemnity contract or 
policy excludes intentional acts. 
 224. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) rev’d, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th 
Cir. 1987). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 257. 
 227. Id. at 372. 
 228. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied by Allen 
v. United States, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). 
 229. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 338. 
 230. Id. at 338–39. 
 231. Id. at 338. 
 232. Id. at 339. “It is the nature of the specific decision, not the fact that some decision or 
choice was made, that is important.” 
2018] DENIAL OF GEOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE 731 
It is irrelevant to the discretion issue whether the AEC or its employees 
were negligent in failing to adequately protect the public. . . . When the 
conduct at issue involves the exercise of discretion by a government 
agency or employee, §2680(a) preserves governmental immunity 
‘whether or not the discretion involved be abused.’ For better or worse, 
plaintiffs here ‘obtain their ‘right to sue from Congress [and] necessarily 
must take it subject to such restrictions as have been imposed.’233 
The context of Allen and this analysis together provide the clearest 
example in the precedent cases of the application of the discretionary 
function exception to specific decisions by the government that knowingly 
subject people to risk of harm, including death. If the government 
recognizes the risk and goes ahead with the action, it is immune under 
discretionary function immunity. It does not need to justify this decision, 
and there is no question of right or wrong because it is a knowing 
engagement of the risk. This is when the FTCA is in starkest contrast to 
private tort law.234 
6. The Federal Torts Claims Act Analysis in Graci 
Robinson basically relitigates Graci, suing the Corps for hurricane 
flooding allegedly caused by the MRGO funneling water into the city and 
increasing surge. Since the plaintiffs and the judge in Robinson based their 
arguments on Graci, it is instructive to look at what the trial judge in Graci 
decided about the plaintiffs’ factual and FTCA claims when he reviewed the 
case on remand.235 
The Graci court found that under Louisiana law, the United States 
would be liable for its acts and negligence, if any, in the construction of the 
MRGO to the extent that they caused damages.236 He also found that 
Congress authorized the MRGO, that plaintiffs had not shown that the Corps 
deviated from the project Congress envisioned, and that the plaintiffs did not 
show any negligence in the “design, construction or functioning of said 
project.”237 
These findings are relevant to Robinson, because the plaintiffs in 
Robinson allege that design decisions made in the 1950s, prior to Graci, 
showed that the Corps knew that the banks of the MRGO should have been 
 
 233. Allen, 816 F.2d at 1421–22 (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 31 
(1953)). 
 234. It is ironic that Allen is not cited in any of the Hurricane Katrina litigation, despite 
being the most on point precedent on discretionary authority. 
 235. Graci v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. La. 1977). 
 236. Id. at 195–96 (noting that the MRGO had no effect on the flooding). 
 237. Id. at 196. 
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armored.238 This argument is then bolstered by references to a 1963 report 
from the Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors that also called for 
riprap (i.e., rock used to armor the shoreline) along the MRGO.239 The court 
concludes that this is evidence that the negligent failure to use riprap was 
associated with the MRGO, and not with the flood control plan.240 Yet if 
these decisions were adjudged proper at the time they were made, it is hard 
to say that they were outside the Corps’s discretion in subsequent litigation. 
Most importantly, the Graci court finding that causation failed: 
27. Hurricane Betsy, while unusually ferocious, was not the only 
hurricane to produce flooding in the areas occupied by plaintiffs’ 
property. Since 1900, 88 hurricanes and tropical storms have traversed 
through or by the Louisiana coast. Three of these, in 1915, 1947, and 
1956, prior to the construction of the MRGO, produced flooding similar 
to that experienced in Hurricane Betsy . . . . Within the inundated areas 
are those occupied by plaintiffs’ properties.   
28. While the damage caused by Hurricane Betsy was far more severe 
than that occasioned during prior hurricanes, the severity and track of 
Hurricane Betsy are responsible therefor as opposed to any man-made 
construction such as the MRGO. Betsy was so severe that all the 
Louisiana coastal lowlands experienced some inundation and following 
Betsy’s occurrence the scientific parameters for calculating hurricane 
protection were, of necessity, recomputed.
241
 
The Graci court recognized the reality of hurricanes in southern 
Louisiana. The area flooded by Hurricane Betsy had flooded many times 
before the MRGO was built and the cypress forests disappeared. The court 
accepted the scientific findings that the MRGO was too small to affect surge 
in major hurricanes.242 In the forty years after Hurricane Betsy, the area 
continues to subside, and sea level has increased, with relative sea level rise 
constantly increasing the flooding risk. 
 
 238. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 654 (E.D. La. 
2009) (Robinson). 
 239. Id. at 656. 
 240. Graci, 435 F. Supp. at 195–96. 
 241. Id. at 193. 
 242. CHARLES L. BRETSCHNEIDER & J. IAN COLLINS, STORM SURGE EFFECTS OF THE 
MISSISSIPPI RIVER-GULF OUTLET: STUDY A (National Engineering Science Company) (1966) 
(“It is seen that the effect of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet is almost negligible for all 
large hurricanes accompanied by slow rising storm surges. It may be expected that once in a 
while a storm may occur which has a somewhat freakish. more rapidly rising surge in which 
case the Gulf Outlet Channel may have a very marked effect. However, such a storm will not 
produce tides which are as high as the more critical hurricane tracks such as Betsy or the 
synthetic hurricanes.”). 
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7. The Robinson Trial 
We now return to Robinson, which went to trial following the court’s 
decision in 17
th
 Street Canal.243 Recall that the Robinson court rejected the 
government’s motion to dismiss under FCA immunity, comparing the 
hurricane to a Navy vessel as the phantom levee breaker, an analogy that 
persists throughout the judge’s arguments.244 The district judge began by 
noting that nothing he had seen in all the motions and evidence before the 
court in the two years since the hearing for the motion to dismiss changed 
his reading of Graci and Central Green.245 
The court then provided a history of the MRGO and the Lake 
Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Plan (LVP), the plan set in 
motion by Congress in 1955 after a series of hurricanes flooded New 
Orleans.246 The presentation of this history reads like a traditional tort case 
against a private party: 
Buried in various Corps’ reports some of which are discussed, infra, are 
unequivocal, positive statements that underscore the Corps’ knowledge 
that the MRGO would not be a static, unchanging waterway. It was clear 
from its inception that because of its location, degradation of the area 
would result unless proper, prophylactic measures were taken. In fact, 
some measures were included in the Corps’ plans; they simply were not 
implemented in time to prevent immense environmental destruction.
247
 
There are additional allegations about how the widening of the MRGO 
through wave action threatened the flood control levees outside the 
MRGO.248 The plaintiffs also argued that the improper maintenance of the 
MRGO and its subsequent widening required the Corps to file a 
supplementary environmental impact statement. In sum, the plaintiffs’ case 
is that the Corps ignored the threat that the MRGO posed to the flood 
control levees, and that it was the MRGO that caused the levee failure. The 
Corps had notice and knowledge of the risk and made a decision not to act 
on the knowledge. 249 
 
 243. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d 644 (Robinson). 
 244. See, e.g., id. at 692; see also supra text accompanying note 194. 
 245. See In Re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 648 (Robinson) (introducing the earlier 
reading of the two cases and beginning the analysis where the earlier opinion left off). 
 246. Id. at 649–53. For much of the history, the court relies on a Corps report: DOUGLAS 
WOOLLEY & LEONARD SHABMAN, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, DECISION-MAKING 
CHRONOLOGY FOR THE LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN & VICINITY HURRICANE PROTECTION PROJECT 
(Mar. 2008), https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/katrina/hpdc/Final_HPDC_Apr3_2008.pdf. 
 247. Id. at 653. 
 248. Id. at 697–98. 
 249. See id. at 666 (“As to the north shore, the callous and/or myopic approach of the 
Corps to the obvious deleterious nature of the MRGO is beyond understanding.”). 
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The judge then proceeds to transform Hurricane Katrina’s flood waters 
into his Navy vessel. He sees a major problem with the Corps’s failure to 
armor the sides of the MRGO with rock to prevent erosion and widening.250 
While the decision whether to armor a channel to protect a flood control 
levee would seem to fall directly under § 702c, in this court’s view that 
decision was part of the (nonimmune) decision-making about the 
navigational aspects of the MRGO. In response to the government’s 
evidence that the levee failed and was overtopped because it was not 
constructed at the design height, a pure § 702c decision, the court responded 
that if “the Navy vessel ran into a papier mâché levee, the vessel would still 
be a substantial factor in the damage.”251 
The court concluded that the failure to prevent the natural widening of 
the MRGO hastened the destruction of the flood control levee during the 
hurricane.252 Thus, the negligence in maintaining the MRGO becomes the 
equivalent of negligently mooring a Navy vessel.253 The Navy vesselmade 
of the Hurricane Katrina storm surgethen breaches the flood control 
levees. In the court’s view, the negligence in maintaining the MRGO is not 
superseded by § 702c immunity.254 
The FTCA discretionary authority defense was disposed of by finding 
that the Corps violated various questionable duties. These include a duty to 
ask Congress for money255 and a failure to properly assess the MRGO’s 
risks to wetlands in a 1976 environmental impact statement under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 256 The court ignores the pages 
 
 250. See id. at 697 (“This Court is utterly convinced that the Corps’ failure to provide 
timely foreshore protection doomed the channel to grow to two to three times its design width 
and destroyed the banks which would have helped to protect the Reach 2 Levee from front-
side wave attack as well as loss of height.”). 
 251. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 644, 692 (E.D. La. 
2009) (Robinson). 
 252. Id. at 697–98. 
 253. Id. at 698 (“The Corps’ ‘Navy vessel’ devastated this levee.”). 
 254. Thus, the Corps’ decisions were made in the context of the MRGO project, not 
within the context of the LPV. None of these decisions directly concerned the LPV or its 
construction. Foreshore protection and addressing salinity issues had to do with wave wash 
that was causing severe erosion of the banks of the MRGO and led to an exponential growth 
of the channel far beyond that which was approved by Congress. Thus, the failures at issue 
here are extrinsic to the LPV and are not subject to § 702c immunity. Id. at 699. 
 255. Id. at 663 (“Never was any direct funding approach taken even when the Corps knew 
it had triggered catastrophic erosion caused by the very channel it had created.”). 
 256. Id. at 725 (“Plaintiffs have presented substantial, clear and convincing evidence 
outlined above that the Corps itself internally recognized that the MRGO was causing 
significant changes in the environment—that is the disappearance of the adjacent wetlands to 
the MRGO and the effects thereof on the human environment—which triggered reporting 
requirements. The Corps cannot ignore the dictates of NEPA and then claim the protection of 
the discretionary exception based on its own apparent self-deception.”). 
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of evidence that the Corps knowingly and intentionally weighed the facts 
and chose its course of action.257 None of these alleged breaches of duty is 
relevant to the Corps’s authority. Allen tells us that such knowing behavior 
is the strongest proof of discretionary action, yet Allen is never mentioned in 
this case.258 
a. Robinsonthe Fifth Circuit Round I 
The case was appealed, and after oral argument, the appeals court 
rendered its first opinion, In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation.259 This 
opinion basically tracked the district court’s opinion, finding no § 702c Act 
immunity other than for the 17th Street cases and for the NEPA claims.260 It 
accepted the finding that the Corps was negligent in its decisions about 
maintaining MRGO, and that this negligence was the cause of the levee 
failures and plaintiffs’ damages. As with the district court case, this 
negligence was based on a showing that the Corps was aware of the erosion 
of MRGO and that this erosion led to the failure of the flood control levees 
between MRGO and the plaintiffs.261 
b.  Robinsonthe Fifth Circuit Round II 
Six months later, the same panel of the court withdrew its opinion in 
response to a petition for rehearing and substituted a new opinion, In re 
 
 257. In re Katrina, 647 F. Supp. 2d at 705 (Robinson) (“Plaintiffs respond that the 
Corps’s [sic] defalcations with respect to the maintenance and operation of the MRGO were 
in direct contravention of professional engineering and safety standards and thus the Corps is 
prohibited from seeking protection from this exception. Ignoring safety and poor engineering 
are not policy, and clearly the Corps engaged in such activities. The Court finds the latter 
argument more compelling in light of the facts and circumstances of this case.”). 
 258. Inexplicably, the government did not mention Allen in its brief on appeal, and it does 
not appear in the 17th Street opinion, so Judge Duval can perhaps be forgiven for not 
addressing it in this opinion. Id. at 705. 
 259. 673 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit I), opinion withdrawn on reh’g, 
696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit II). 
 260. Id at 393. (“NEPA’s procedural mandates require agencies to inform their discretion 
in decisionmaking. An agency that complies with NEPA gives outside influences (the public, 
lawmakers, other agencies) more information with which to put pressure on that agency, but 
the original agency retains substantive decisionmaking power regardless. At most, the Corps 
has abused its discretion—an abuse explicitly immunized by the DFE.”). 
 261. Id. at 399 (“The district court’s careful attention to the law and even more cautious 
scrutiny of complex facts allow us to uphold its expansive ruling in full, excepting our minor 
restatement of FCA immunity. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgments in Robinson and 
Anderson, leaving each party as he was before this appeal. Similarly, we DENY the 
government’s petition for a writ of mandamus to stay the Armstrong trial.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation.262 The court still accepted the district 
court’s rejection of § 702c immunity: 
Thus, after Central Green, waters have the immune character of “flood 
waters” if the government’s link to the waters is through flood-control 
activity. That is to say, the government’s acting upon waters for the 
purpose of flood control is flood-control activity, and flood-control 
activity is what gives waters an immune “character.” We therefore reject 
the government’s interpretation of the scope of Section 702c and 
conclude, instead, that the United States enjoys immunity under that 
section only where damages result from waters released by flood-control 
activity or negligence therein.
263
 
This appears to conflict with the “character of the waters” test from 
Central Green.264 The panel’s substitute opinion revises its analysis of the 
discretionary function exception from the FTCA as applied to the critical 
question of whether the Corps’s decision to not armor the MRGO to prevent 
erosion was analogous to an error in a scientific calculation.265 The court 
recognizes that while the decisions do include scientific calculations, if they 
also evidence policy considerations then they are immune under the 
discretionary authority exception.266 
Recognizing that the discretionary function exception does not require 
the Government to make the “right” decision is an important change in the 
court’s position. The district court focused on what the Corps knew about 
the risks of flooding to New Orleans. It treated this as guilty knowledge that 
demanded action, as if the Corps was a private tortfeasor knowingly putting 
its victims at risk. But the government is charged with making political 
decisions about risk in what are often zero-sum situations. 
While not citing Allen, the new opinion is consistent with its reasoning: 
if the government is making a policy choice that is otherwise allowed by 
law, it is protected by the discretionary function exception. The government 
does not need to explore all possible risks and alternatives that might put 
 
 262. 696 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 2012) (Robinson 5th Circuit II), cert. denied, Lattimore v. 
United States, 570 U.S. 926 (2013). 
 263. Id. at 446. 
 264. See Central Green Co. v. United States, 531 U.S. 425, 437 (2001) 
 265. BRETSCHNEIDER & COLLINS, supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 266. In Re Katrina, 696 F.3d at 451 (Robinson 5th Circuit II) (“Although the Corps 
appears to have appreciated the benefit of foreshore protection as early as 1967, the record 
shows that it also had reason to consider alternatives (such as dredging and levee “lifts”) and 
feasibility before committing to an armoring strategy that, in hindsight, may well have been 
optimal. The Corps’s actual reasons for the delay are varied and sometimes unknown, but 
there can be little dispute that the decisions here were susceptible to policy considerations. 
Whatever the actual reasons for the delay, the Corps’s failure to armor timely Reach 2 is 
shielded by the DFE.”). 
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fewer people at risk. If the government’s decision results in injuries, the 
proper remedy is compensation through the political process, not litigation. 
The court dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims in Robinson and in the related 
cases.267 
III. CONCLUSION 
Even though the Robinson ruling did not stand, its reading of Central 
Green still stands and undermines § 702c immunity in the
 
Fifth Circuit. This 
leaves the courts free to second guess the Corps for every failed levee or 
decision to not build a levee. While the discretionary authority exception is a 
powerful defense, as this case and others demonstrate, that will only come 
years after a hugely expensive litigation process and trial. In the process, 
plaintiffs can use the courts to undermine belief in the risks of climate 
change, attributing the damages from inherent geologic risk and sea level 
rise to bad planning by the Corps. 
These cases fuel the national myth that New Orleans would have been 
fine but for the failures of the Corps. That myth is based on a steady state 
earth. It has driven tens of billions of dollars in new levee construction 
premised on the belief that the problem is bad levees and not an ever-
increasing threat from subsidence and global warming-driven sea level rise. 
The steady state earth model also includes the redemption myth: if the Corps 
broke it, the Corps can fix it. This is already embodied in the Corps’s 
Mississippi River Gulf Outlet Ecosystem Restoration Plan, a $3 billion plan 
which depends on a steady state earth to succeed.268 
The United States has tens of millions of people and trillions of dollars 
of infrastructure at risk from global warming-driven sea level rise, or the 
combination of sea level rise and subsidence. On the Atlantic and Gulf 
Coasts, hurricanes transform the risk of slow immersion into the existential 
risk of catastrophic hurricane damages. Despite the ultimate failure of all of 
the Hurricane Katrina claims against the federal government, the steady 
state earth view of the Robinson trial court has been accepted as the true 
 
 267. This included a group of cases refiled under admiralty law after being dismissed as 
FTCA claims: “Here, the appellants seek to distinguish their claims, now pled under the Suits 
in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), 46 U.S.C. § 30901 et seq., the Public Vessels Act (“PVA”), 46 
U.S.C. § 31101 et seq., and the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101 
et seq., on the theory that by dredging with a method called box-cutting, the government 
acted negligently and violated various federal and state statutes and regulations. We are not 
persuaded and affirm the judgment. The decision on the method of dredging is shielded by 
the discretionary function exception.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig. v. United States 
616 F. App’x 659, 660 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 268. Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) Ecosystem Restoration, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF 
ENGINEERS, http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/Missions/Environmental/MRGOEcosystem 
Restoration.aspx. 
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story of Hurricane Katrina.269 The New Orleans levees have been rebuilt but 
the core threat of climate change and delta geology has not changed. 
Blaming the Corps will not keep New Orleans safe from flooding. It will 
only distract us from the real threats facing New Orleans and every other 
low lying coastal city. 
 
 269. The Federal Circuit did raise the issue of the government evidence on the limited 
impact of the MRGO. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1363 n.9 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018). 
